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ABSTRACT
A RESPONSE TO RATIONALISM:
EDMUND BURKE AND THE CONTEMPORARY TURN TO TRADITIONS
FEBRUARY 1989
WILLIAM H. PLOOG
,
B.A., INDIANA UNIVERSITY
Ph . D
. ,
UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS
Directed by: Professor Jerome King
The contemporary turn to traditions in social and
political theory, exemplified in the works of Alasdair
MacIntyre and Michael Walzer, can be distinguished from
other forms of traditionalism by the emphasis placed on a
critical engagement with traditions. In critical tradition-
alism traditions are understood to embody debates and dis-
agreements over their meaning, their scope, and their valid-
ity. It is argued that a turn to traditions offers the pos-
sibility of a politics in which the history and experience
of past generations mattered. I also show that a politics
with remembrance enhances the rationality of political
action. I argue that neither Walzer nor MacIntyre
adequately concern themselves with the issue of how we are
related to traditions and to the past. How is it that we
ought to find ourselves "in" a web of traditions? In Edmund
Burke's concept of inheritance we find an articulate view of
how one might understand oneself as part of a tradition. I
examine to what extent Burkean living in tradition is com-
patible with a critical appropriation of tradition. My
interpretation stresses the strong emotional resonance of
v
the term "inheritance" and the way in which it is a reflec-
tion of family life. I conclude that criticism "within the
family" may be subject to various difficulties, including
the fear of offending the "fathers"; but I also argue that
Burke's understanding of practical politics and the need to
keep the language of justice from becoming platitudinous
goes some distance toward mitigating these difficulties. I
pursue the question of our relationship to traditions a bit
further when I discuss Milan Kundera 1 s Unbearable Lightness
of Being and Alfred Doeblin's Karl and Rosa. Kundera chal-
lenges the turn to traditions with his notion of kitsch.
Doeblin challenges the view developed in the dissertation
that our recollection of deceased relations (our dead ances-
tors for instance) may mediate a relationship to the past
that is also critical.
vi
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Recently, Bruce James Smith complained of the absence
of historical recollection within contemporary politics,
citing our failure to create "true and lasting passions" as
a cause of the disappearance of New Left and progressive
politics. ^ His point is well taken. At stake is more than
the failure to learn from the experiences of past progres-
sive movements. When we no longer remember the goals of the
civil rights movement for instance, our political sense of
self is diminished and clouded. We know less about who we
are as political beings. The past contains clues to our
identity as well as a record of tactics, struggles, and
errors in judgment. Furthermore, the rationality of politi-
cal action is endangered if we no longer believe that future
generations will take up the goals and projects we have
begun to complete. Political activity rarely attains its
end in a once and forever fashion. Political action re-
quires that future others acknowledge our sacrifices and the
value of our politics--in short, that they remember us. If
we are remembered, it is likely that we will be remembered
in connection with tradition. Those traditions will be
experienced by future generations, if they are experienced
at all, as something that comes to them from the past. The
rationality of political action is also clearly diminished
when politicians can get away with reducing our collective
experience to a set of symbols that they manipulate at
2will. A sense of history is vital to making good political
decisions
.
As I hope to make clear throughout this dissertation,
what motivates the seemingly disparate parts is a dilemma
affecting the attempt to have a politics which includes
"remembrance". Remembrance is a recollection of history in
the broad sense of including the traditions, the social
practices, the events that have shaped traditions, and a
sense of our being linked with the past. Our personal
identities, the projects or obligations that we affirm are
rooted in a sense of history. Remembrance instills a poli-
tical sense of self, an orientation and set of issues for
politics
.
A politics in which traditions have a place will poten-
tially be a politics containing a degree of social solidar-
ity and consensus which in turn can support collective
action and political discourse. By providing a common
language and a set of ideals, traditions link individuals to
a common world. Politics operates with a historical sense
of how the present shape of politics and issues informing it
are linked to the past. A politics of traditions promises
that debate over genuine political issues will take the
place of the politics of self-assertive individuals. No
longer will I merely assert my interests in politics; I will
allow those interests to be brought into question ."3 The
individual preferences of economic man, accepted as given by
economic theory, are opened up to scrutiny when they are
interpreted as elements of traditions.
3
The two theorists that I will discuss in the next
chapter agree that rational action and political discourse
depend upon a sense of traditions. According to MacIntyre,
those who place themselves beyond our inherited traditions
are without a coherent moral view. Ethical obligation is
sustained and developed when the self understands its his-
torical roots. Cut off from history the self merely expres-
ses emotions, it "emotes".
For Walzer, if we take away our traditions we deprive
ourselves of the concrete terms of justice and turn the
quest for justice into abstract speculation. Both MacIntyre
and Walzer are traditionalist without being political con-
servatives. They understand traditions as embodying debates
that require our participation. Traditions are significant
terms of discourse and political identities and not the
language that renders political discourse and debate un-
necessary .
It is important to distinguish the traditionalism of
recent political theory from our ordinary notion of tra-
ditionalism. Understanding traditions as embodied social
arguments and debates, as results of conflicts that are
essentially problematic and open to revision, is the essen-
tial thrust of the contemporary turn to traditions. 3ut
this thrust is unappealing to the traditionalist for whom
the apparent naturalness of tradition is crucial. ihe
4traditionalist in this sense of the term believes that
reflective awareness complicates traditions and necessarily
undermines their appeal. First of all. traditions seen in a
problematic light would be incapable of providing a fixed
and secure identity—something that leaves no doubts or
questions
. Secondly, the apparent naturalness of tradi-
tions, which lends traditions a sense of being more than
humanly created artifacts, is undermined when we see them in
terms of a debate.
The recent attention within political theory to the
idea of traditions I describe as a turn to traditions.^ I
do not wish to discuss why the turn to traditions arose.
Both Walzer and MacIntyre understand their respective work
as a response to the abstract, ahistorical theorizing of
recent liberal theory, especially the theory inspired by
John Rawls' A Theory of Justice . I will offer here an ab-
breviated argument which attacks the abstract image of the
self frequently presented in liberal theory . 5 Frithof
Bergmann argues that
:
...an act is free if the agent identifies with the ele-
ments from which it flows; it is coerced if the agent
disassociates himself from the element which generates
or prompts the action. This means that identification
is logically prior to freedom, and that freedom is a
derivative notion. Freedom is a function of iden-
tification and stands in a relationship of dependence
to that with which a man identifies. If an identifica-
tion is present, the corresponding freedom appears.
The primary condition of freedom is the possession of
an identity, or of a self--f reedom is the acting out of
that identity .*5 Ony emphasis)
The notion of negative freedom by emphasizing "freedom from"
over "freedom to do or be something" lends support to a
5nihilistic sense of self. If the self is possessed only of
a sense of being free from emotions, reasons, and desires—
this would truly be an unencumbered self ~-f reedom would lie
in actions affirming its distance from emotions, feelings,
and reason. If such an "individual" actually existed, he
would be the Underground Man of Dostoevski .
^
The possession of a particular social identity, or of
social identities, is critical for the rationality of ac-
tions and the exercise of freedom . 8 The emphasis on sub-
mitting social identities and the traditions they encapsu-
late to discussion distinguishes the contemporary turn to
traditions from the view that only an assigned place in a
social hierarchy with specific duties and responsibilities
saves us from nihilistic anarchy.
This dissertation does concern itself with a potential
difficulty within the critical traditionalism of the recent
turn to traditions. Is our location within and attachment
to traditions as straight forward as Walzer and MacIntyre
seem to imply? As we shall see, MacIntyre and Walzer treat
our link to traditions simply as a matter of recognizing who
we really are. We really know the reality of traditions but
we are, especially intellectuals, bewitched by abstract
notions and blinded by modern, abstract accounts of moral
agency and self. I argue that the turn to traditions does
itself harm by treating our location within traditions as
devoid of any intrinsic difficulties for a critical tradi-
The turn to traditions misses a significanttionaiism
.
6problem for a critical traditionalism. I want to turn to
Pericles
' funeral oration as a way of introducing this
problem
.
It is interesting that Pericles chooses the occasion of
a funeral oration for recent battle dead to remind Athenians
of their finest virtues and of their obligation to Athens.
The address to those who mourn a son or father expands to
include the entire city. What can be said to the mourners
in particular must, it seems, embrace all Athenians. We
immediately understand why.
Pericles links their deaths to the ancestors of all
Athenians: "I shall begin with our ancestors [who] handed
it [our country] down free to the present time by their
valor... our fathers spared no pains to be able to leave
their acquisition to us of the present generation." The
fallen Athenian soldiers have done the same for living
Athenians and their descendants. So clearly, Athenians owe
something to their ancestors who "spared no pains" for them
(who suffered for them) and to the dead soldiers who gave
their lives for Athens. We can imagine how Pericles' evok-
ing of the fathers' sacrifice added more weight to the
burden of the survivors. For how can they possibly repay
those who died and sacrificed themselves for Athens? Of
the dead Pericles says:
. .
.each of them individually received that renown which
never grows old, and for a sepulchre, not so much that
in which their bones have been deposited, but that
noblest of shrines wherein their glory is laid up to be
eternally remembered upon every occasion on which deed
7or story shall fall for its commemoration. For heroes
have the whole earth for their tomb ... 9
They have the whole world for a tomb (our world is their
tomb) provided, of course, that they are remembered for what
they did and for what their sacrifices made possible. For
the mourners gathered (and for the dead they are gathered
before) Pericles delivers a tribute to the city of Athens,
celebrating her history, her greatest qualities, and her
most significant achievements. The apparent point is that
the Athenian traditions must be continued. Our dead require
this of us. The collective narrative of Athens must include
a chapter that makes sense of this most recent sacrifice and
loss .
I am suggesting that an obligation to the dead can
locate us in traditions. Out of an obligation to the Athen-
ians who gave their lives for Athens comes the demand that
their sacrifice be made intelligible. The task of justify-
ing their sacrifice and ameliorating the sense of loss
brings Athenians closer to their traditions as the question
of the meaning of Athenian way of life is forced upon them.
The force the dead exert can have a very positive
influence on politics if W. Lloyd Warner is correct and
their deaths "become powerful sacred symbols which organize,
direct, and constantly revive the collective ideals of the
community and nation ." 10 If we understand this to mean that
the traditions are neither forgotten nor simply repeated and
imitated, then traditionalism is critical. On the other
hand, war veterans (and their organizations, the VFW and
8American Legion) are notably intolerant of innovation in
American traditions. We can see why. They look at events
only from within the perspective of their dead comrades and
their time ignoring the history and experience we have
accumulated since their deaths. Being true to the dead
means remaining within their understanding of the traditions
they died for. 11 Altering and reconstructing the tradition
appears disloyal. Of course, one wants to say that one
ought to be loyal to the point of the tradition and not to
the specifics which took shape under a particular set of
circumstances. The meaning of a tradition is clarified in
time and every tradition reguires reinterpretation. The
1 O
dead, however, can speak in a demanding voice. In Chapter
Four we will discuss the attempt of Friedrich Becker to
remain loyal to the dead of WW1 . Becker cannot do anything
that makes up for their deaths. He finds no satisfactory
way of acting on his strong sense of obligation to those who
died in the carnage of WW1 . However, his sense of obliga-
tion forces him to critically assess the political tradi-
tions, the popular morality, and the educational system of
Germany
.
I would not say that a critical traditionalism is
doomed to forever falter at the sepulchers of the ancestors
and war dead. At this point I want only to note this dif-
ficulty. On the positive side, remembrance is obviously
heightened. Repaying the dead draws us into traditions as
we seek an answer to the questions: For what did they die?
9For what ideals did they die? Who is responsible for their
deaths? Guilt is no doubt a factor. We know for whom they
died
.
Joseph Amato, the author of Guilt and Gratitude
, ex-
perienced first hand a political debate over remembering the
Viet Nam war. Amato characterizes the debate in an inter-
esting way. Whereas the legionnaires found judgment in
their father's eyes, the professors felt judged by their
imagined children's eyes. The latter were motivated by
guilt of the sort "that calls on one to serve mankind" and a
changing world. Gratitude affirming "the worth of maintain-
ing present relations" motivated the former. Moreover,
gratitude "points backward in time toward first gifts"
,
forming exclusive attachments involving, even demanding,
trust, affection, obedience, and subservience."
We will want to see whether gratitude for "first gifts"
demands our subservience to the fathers. If it does then
critical traditionalism must be wary of locating itself in
traditions through a sense of gratitude for what our fathers
and our ancestors have given us--lest the dead bury the
living and those yet unborn.
As Amato himself would agree, the ideal is some kind of
combination of guilt with gratitude, of the prospective and
retrospective casts of mind. Edmund Burke seems to be
expressing such a synthesis when he says, "people will not
look forward to posterity who never look backward to their
ancestors". Burke's surprising statement implies that we
10
will not feel the eyes of the children on us unless we turn
to our ancestors. The meaning of the backward turn toward
the ancestors is the theme for the chapter on Edmund Burke.
An additional example of the difficulties that may
plague a critical traditionalism can be found in the dif-
fering reactions to President Reagan's visit to Bitburg
cemetery in West Germany. Sheldon Wolin is correct in
calling the President's visit a celebration of amnesia at
the expense of memory
.
14 Reagan did, however, provoke a
storm of conflicting remembrances, which showed that the
experience of remembrance, even of the same event, can cause
disharmony and conflict.
The visit to a German military cemetery set the tone
and determined the outcome of the event so that the in-
clusion of a concentration camp did little to alter the
significance of Reagan's visit to Germany. As Geofrey
Hartman put it, "Bitburg recalled nothing but common sacri-
fice and a shared code of military honor." The emotions on
the German side (in fairness there were a variety of re-
actions) were quite understandable and were capably ex-
pressed by Dregger
,
the floor leader of the Christian Demo-
cratic Union, who stated amidst the calls for cancelling the
visit to Bitburg, that a cancellation "insults my brother
and his fallen comrades. Ever loyal to his brother and
to the fallen "Kameraden" Dregger had obvious trouble under-
standing the point of the protests against the visit. He
merely wanted to honor his brother and the other young
Germans who died.
1
1
We can recognize Dregger 1 s position in our Vietnam
veterans who protest that they have been forgotten and that
the value of their sacrifice has been denied. But Helmut
Kohl's notion of reconciliation as a kind of generalized
grief of all for all who have died and suffered obliterates
history by making everyone a victim and setting aside the
question of guilt. From the perspective of Jews who lost
members of their family in the death camps, generalized
grief with the enemy, the murderer, must seem preposterous
and insulting to the memory of their dead.
The speech of the German President Kurt von Weizsacker
in which he without hesitation maintained that reconcil-
iation is possible only with a remembrance of the consequen-
ces of NAZISM and acceptance of responsibility for them puts
Germans like Dregger in an uncomfortable position. If our
recollection stretches past the memory of our lose of a
loved one, grief over the dead gives way to questioning the
conduct of all those who participated in the NAZI regime.
It turns out that these dead german soldiers—our sons,
fathers and brothers—cannot be respected as “men of uncom-
mon wisdom" to borrow from Burke. Nor can they be respected
as soldiers who gave their lives for a worthy ideal. It is
not surprising then that Weizsacker in his speech directs
emphasis away from the question of guilt to the present
responsibility of all Germans (no matter what their parents
12
did during the war) to accept and deal with the past.
Weizsacker tells Germany, "we are all affected by its conse-
quences and liable for it..." Fur thermore--and this is
meant to alert all Germans to the significance of their
history--he explains, "whosoever closes his eyes to the past
cannot see the present." In other words, Germany if you
want to understand the present, know your history! One
wonders if knowing the present will ever be as compelling a
motivation as serving the dead. That the act of mourning
rivets us to the dead is demonstrated by the Jewish reac-
tion. When reading Menachem Rosensaf
t
1 s account of the
memorial services held at Bergen-Belsen one is struck by the
passion behind his conviction that the dead will not be
abandoned. Weizsacker ends his historic speech with a
realistic sense of the difficulties involved in a remem-
brance which remains true to history: "On this 8th of May,
let us face up to the truth as well as we can." 17
To quickly summarize my argument up to this point, I am
arguing that critical traditionalism must squarely face the
ambiguity of the emotional forces that impel one to look
backward toward the ancestors, to the traditions of the
community and the collective narrative. On the one hand, we
are drawn to the past, to our collective history and our
traditions when we experience it as the world of our
fathers, as the world that our friends and close relations
made sacrifices for. The past is no longer insignificant,
history is no longer "bunk". The examples of Bitburg and
13
war remembrances raise doubts as to whether a traditionalism
which is interwoven with recollections of intimate relations
can ever be a critical traditionalism.
In the case of Edmund Burke we see that his notion of
what it is to act justly helps to give his traditionalism a
critical edge. Thus he overcomes to some degree the un-
critical element intrinsic to a sense of the past mediated
by familial and intimate attachments. In Chapter Three I
will show the significance of local attachments of family
and friends, the "little platoon", for understanding the
character of Burke's attachment to the past. The idea of
inheritance, the most important concept for understanding
his view of tradition, is not a legal term so much as it is
an expression imbued with the bonds of affection and obliga-
tion that define, sustain and reflect the intimacy of family
life. At times Burke articulated a position which was not a
conservative version of traditionalism. Burke's demand that
we enlarge our sense of morality and be constantly aware
that the present always contains novelty suggests an open-
ness and capacity for self criticism. Nevertheless, any
assessment of Burke must take into account the difficulties
a traditionalism mediated by intimate relations pose for
criticism. I was initially attracted to Burke because of
his more compelling relationship to traditions. MacIntyre
and Walzer not only fail to consider the foundation of a
traditionalism—how we turn toward the past but that they
often show a desire to take up our "inheritance" from Burke.
14
For Instance, both theorists want a concept of community
united across time. A historically aware political com-
munity is central to the theories of both theorists.
Burke's description of a "partnership" binding past, present
and future generations is justly famous and quite clear as
to what is involved in a partnership of generations. If
there is an unacknowledged dependence on the thought of
Burke within the theories of MacIntyre and Walzer then
problems in Burke's thought may affect the success of their
own projects.
I bring the dissertation to an end with a chapter that
develops more fully the problematic relationship to tradi-
tions that I suggest in the course the dissertation charts.
My focus will be on two novels, The Unbearable Lightness of
Being by Milan Kundera, and Karl and Rosa by Alfred Doeblin.
Both writers concern themselves with the meaning and mean-
inglessness of history and our problematic relationship to
history. With their help, I hope to be able to explore in
more concrete detail how the past comes down to us and what
motivates a turn to traditions.
Thus far I have assumed that traditions present them-
selves effectively only in the recollection of our intimate
relations—a recollection which forces us to turn to tradi-
tions. The traditionalism of war veterans, of survivors of
the holocaust, and of surviving sons and daughters can be
best described as a turn to the past mediated by a recollec-
tion of intimate relations. Given the potential difficul-
15
ties of this window on the past, we ought to ask whether a
turn to traditions might be carried out in some other way.
Although I do not pursue this question systematically,
I do explore the possibility of alternative sources of
critical traditionalism when I consider the recent work of
Michael Walzer and Alasdair MacIntyre. I argue that neither
MacIntyre nor Walzer give a satisfactory account of our
relationship to tradition and the explanations they do give
of our situatedness in traditions are unsatisfactory. Both
theorists largely ignore how we relate to traditions.
Weizsacker offered a simple and direct alternative to
the above that we should consider. Recall that he did not
attempt to provoke a sense of guilt; he claimed only that
Germans will not understand their present unless they turn
to the past. He appealed to the idea that the consequences
of Germany's past must be addressed by all Germans, the
guilty and innocent alike. All Germans must live with the
consequences of German history. The turn to traditions
requires nothing more than, say, a desire to understand the
present—which is a task that, presumably, most of us are
adequately motivated to undertake for quite ordinary
reasons. However, we see immediately that the neat solu-
tion fails to work. What are the consequences of WWII that
Germans should perceive in contemporary Germany? Ihe
accusation that Germans perpetrated great crimes is
certainly one such consequence. Would Germany be adequately
dealing with those accusations if present day Germans in-
16
sisted that it was another Germany which was at fault? In
other words, the accusations against Germany assume that
there is a connection between present and past Germany. If
Germans felt no sense of responsibility for the past, no
connection to the world of their fathers, they would miss
the enormity of what had happened. German culture and
society as a whole (across time and including the present)
would not receive critical attention. Furthermore, it would
be assumed by these new Germans that since the NAZI era is
past accusations against Germany are anachronistic. In con-
clusion, if we subtract a sense of deep connection (perhaps
mediated by guilt) between NAZI Germany and modern Germany,
the only legacy from WWII for Germans really to consider is
German prosperity. Weizsacker however, clearly wants
Germany to recognize it special responsibility for the
suffering WWII caused.
It is even more important for Germans to understand why
their culture and traditions were so easily appropriated by
NAZISM. A prerequisite for this analysis is a willingness
to turn to those traditions with an open mind and question-
ing attitude. For example, it would be very easy for
Germans to insulate contemporary Germany from criticism by
sharply distinguishing the culture of NAZISM from that of
contemporary Germany. Here the fathers would end up harshly
judged but the children—and their world—would escape
criticism . 20 It is also likely that Germans might seek to
lessen the guilt of their fathers and of the cultural world
17
they were a part of. Instead of a critical assessment of
German traditions, external factors—Treaty of Versailles,
the severe depression, etc.—might be highlighted as causes
of the rise of NAZISM. In both cases we do not find an open
and questioning attitude toward the past.
It would be tempting to think that what is needed is
detachment and that detachment would enhance rationality and
understanding. If war veterans would only put their memor-
ies of their comrades aside, they would understand why the
war was wrong. If Germans would only forget about their
guilt and focus on the question of what contributed to the
rise of NAZISM, then the truth would be discovered. In
other words, a politics of remembrance requires nothing more
than the hard edged discipline of science. The ideal rela-
tion to traditions is nothing more or less than the rela-
tionship holding between a scientist and his object of
study
.
We are not related to traditions in the same way a
scientist is related to his field of research. Our politi-
cal and social identities are internally related to tradi-
tions.^ The relationship of the scientist to the idea of
science or to the tradition of conducting research in his
particular field is the appropriate analogy. Detachment
from science is not a virtue we would recommend to a budding
scientist. Similarly, we expect that an artist must be
devoted to his art in order to perform his work well. A
German detached from the moral issues of WWII would not
18
bother with the difficult task of understanding the root
causes of NAZISM. Detachment from moral issues ironically
makes their resolution less likely because the motivation
and the sense of responsibility to do something are lost.
It is for this reason that I hold that the question of the
character of our location (or situatedness) in traditions is
so fundamentally important. We need not detachment, but
involvement—or engagement. At the same time, the relation-
ship to traditions must not preclude the critical under-
standing of traditions. Reasoning about traditions must
remain possible because otherwise the turn to traditions
becomes nothing more than mere traditionalism.
Hans-Georg Gadamer deals with the issue of the relation
to traditions extensively in Truth and Method . 22
The hermeneutical experience is concerned with what has
been transmitted in tradition. This is what is to be
experienced. But tradition is not simply a process
that we learn to know and be in command of through
experience; it is language, ie. it expresses itself
like a "Thou". A "Thou" is not an object, but stands
in a relationship with us. It would be wrong to think
that this meant that what is experienced in tradition
is to be taken as the meaning of another person, who is
a "Thou". Rather, we consider that the understanding
of tradition does not take the text as an expression of
life of a "Thou", but as a meaningful content detached
from all bonds of the meaning individual, of an "I" or
a "Thou". Still, the relation of the "Thou" and the
meaning of experience in this case must be capable of
contributing to the analysis of the hermeneutical
experience. For tradition is a genuine partner in
communication, with which we have fellowship as does
the "I" with a "Thou".
Gadamer further clarifies the character of the "Thou" when
we truly engage traditions in dialogue. It is not a rela-
tionship in which we seek to know the "Thou" as an object as
19
we would when trying to predict the behavior of another.
Nor is it a relationship in which we understand the "Thou"
solely in our own terms and language. Here we have ignored
the differences of the "Thou" by hastily constructing an
interpretation. The "highest type of hermeneutical ex-
perience", the most proper relationship to traditions, "is
the openness to tradition possessed by effective-historical
consciousness. On the personal level this type of ex-
perience is a genuine human relat ionship--a true "belonging
together", where each person is willing to listen to the
other. At the level of hermeneutical experience openness
requires that we acknowledge our own "historical ity" . We
too stand within a tradition and not from a privileged
position above and superior to mere traditions. The sense
of equality permeating the relationship supports the idea
that what is different may have something to say to me . 24
Instead of assimilating or comparing traditions from the
past, I let myself experience tradition by being open to the
claim to truth emerging from my encounter with tradition.
Gadamer describes such openness as a "readiness for ex-
perience." 2 ^ In a personal friendship we might describe
openness as a willingness to let the other take the initia-
tive .
My interest here is not in judging the validity of
Gadamer 1 s philosophical hermeneutics. The criticisms of
assimilation and of distancing ourselves from traditions
seem persuasive to me. What interests me and concerns this
20
dissertation is the importance an ethically constituted
relationship has for a proper location in traditions. if
Gadamer is correct, then the "I"-"Thou" is a prerequisite to
having a critical traditionalism, a traditionalism able to
engage traditions in a dialogue and debate. My main point
in briefly discussing Gadamer is the light shed on the
significance of the attitude with which we approach tradi-
tions. How traditions are passed on--what they mean--will
depend on how we receive them. Burke's notion of "inheri-
tance" functions in his thought much like the "I-Thou" of
true friendship functions in Gadamer 1 s philosophy of her-
meneutics. "Inheritance" reveals traditions in a certain
way. The important questions are: How are we located in
the traditions of the past? What are the possibilities of
criticism within that type of " locatedness"? The first
question might be thought as a question of what motivates
our taking up a particular attitude toward traditions, or
what conditions the attitude we take toward the past. The
second question, I will attempt to answer by discovering
what constraints our attitude toward the past may exercise
over us. MacIntyre recognizes the significance of how we
approach traditions when he cites the "virtue of having an
adequate sense of traditions to which one belongs of which
confront one" as one of the most important virtues. (See
Chapter Three.)
The relevance of my dissertation for the debates and
projects of recent political theory is evident. There has
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been a great deal of talk about the need for a revival of
the democratic traditions and public philosophy embedded in
our republican traditions and manifested in many of our
political institutions. My work may clarify what is really
involved in a turn to traditions. And more generally, the
difficulties faced by the contemporary turn to traditions
affect any theory that depends on "remembrance"
,
the capa-
bility of people to look backward and see the relevance of
the past for the present
.
For example, if one accepts Amy Gutmann 1 s clarification
of how Rawls justifies the principles of his theory, Rawls
like MacIntyre and Walzer depends on a lively sense of the
past as a means of sustaining and creating the common sense
convictions which undergird the theoretical principles of A
Theory of Justice . If it is not an unencumbered self that
provides an Archimedean point for justification, but rather
the "history and traditions embedded in our public life",
then whether or not MacIntyre and Walzer' s turn to tradi-
tions falters has ramifications extending beyond the ques-
tion of the validity of the contemporary turn to tradi-
tions.^® According to Gutmann ' s contextual ist interpreta-
tion of Rawlsian liberal theory, our willingness to maintain
a commitment to current social practices (which are ethical
in nature--for example, "equality of educational oppor-
tunity, careers open to talent, punishment conditional on
intent) lies at the base of the defense of liberal rights
and the idea chat we ought to treat others as "autonomous
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moral agents." It is precisely the tenuous hold ethical
practices have on us that leads MacIntyre and Walzer to
attack the image of an asocial, unencumbered self that
liberalism seems to present to the world. Gutmann may be
correct, MacIntyre and Michael Sandel may misconstrue liber-
alism and Rawls in particular. However, I believe that the
emotivist self attacked by Maclnytre and the unencumbered
self which is the target of Sandel' s work are reflections of
real life expressions in contemporary culture. They are
indicative of a prevailing ignorance, reluctance, or refusal
to consider the relevance of our history.
The debate over affirmative action can help us assess
the potential significance of the turn to traditions for
contemporary political discourse. Much of that debate has
revolved around the issue of whether it is fair to treat
individuals as members of groups. Should white males who
are living in a time which legally forbids racial and sexual
discrimination and who may find discrimination morally wrong
suffer disadvantages in order to rectify the discrimination
women and minorities have suffered in the past? Neither the
beneficiaries of affirmative action nor the individuals who
find their careers curtailed because of affirmative action
were directly involved in the acts of discrimination which
rationalize the policy of affirmative action. The concept
of group identity across time is therefore essential to
believing that affirmative action is a reasonable response
to the injustice of past discrimination. Take away the
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notion that individuals bear particular social identities
linking us to the past and affirmative action becomes at
best a deeply puzzling notion. Common is the view that
affirmative action is "reverse discrimination" and an as-
sault on individual freedoms and rights.
...The essence of liberalism has always been a concern
with the welfare, rights and responsibilities of in-
dividuals gua individuals
,
not the masses or classes or
other such linguistic abstractions. Furthermore,
although there has been disagreement among liberals as
to what social arrangements might best liberate in-
dividual capacities, no disagreement exists with the
thesis that illiberal means, means that impose avoida-
ble injustices on individuals, cannot achieve just
ends . .
.
...[if] a white male [he] is "guilty" of job discrimi-
nation because other white males have so discriminated
and therefore reparations are justified and required--
something seems peculiar. We find no concern for the
individual . What the person did as a person is ir-
relevant. His gender and race in some mysterious way
render him guilty of offenses and deserving admittedly
unfair treatment . 27
Indeed, according to an individualistic concept of the self,
it is a mystery as to how white males can be held respon-
sible for actions they did not commit. If responsibility is
not being asserted by proponents of affirmative action, what
reasons justify penalizing white males for past wrongs?
Proponents of affirmative cannot deny that the interests of
white males are harmed . 28 One can justify harming their
interests if one can establish a linkage between past and
present which implicates and holds white males responsible
as a group for discriminatory practices. For a number of
reasons, this task would not be an easy one .
29 Clearly, if
we accepted our inheritance as partly constitutive of our
own world, the past history of legally sanctioned
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discrimination and the present situation of inequality would
be continuous. It would then make sense to argue that the
problems of our father's generation are moral obligations
the sons must live up to. In other words, if the self were
at least partially constituted by social identities carrying
the history of the nation, references to obligations of a
particular group would not be mysterious. What "I did as a
person" would not be "irrelevant". The "I" understood in a
social sense includes social aggregates that have a history.
"I am a (white) American" entails responsibility for the
present day consequences of past discrimination and racism
because I identify with the history of white America.
Ideally, I not only identify with the moments of glory, but
I accept the ambiguous nature of my her i tage-- i ts ethical
dilemmas and moral complexities.
The dependence of many of the arguments for affirmative
action on a sense of responsibility that is historical in
nature is easy to show. In The Lengthening Shadow or
Slavery: A Historical Justification for Affirmative Action
for Blacks in Higher Education we find the assumption that
"acting justly in the present and future" demands that we
not only recall the past but that we also feel a respon-
sibility for it . 30 We find no mention of the problem of how
individuals removed from the experience of discrimination
will assume responsibilities for the past. Court cases show
a similar dependence on individuals accepting responsibility
for the past. A discussion of the history of discrimination
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seems to act as a justification for affirmative action. No
additional reasoning is deemed necessary.
...Basic self-interests of the individual must be
balanced with social interests, and in circumstances
where blacks have been discriminated against for years,
there is no alternative but to require that certain
minorities be taken into consideration with respect to
specific minority percentage of the population in a
given area . .
.
3
1
It is one thing to agree to the abstract notion that we have
a social interest in combating the effects of discrimina-
tion. Once we move to the area of prescription the task of
justifying the necessary costs illuminates the problematic
character of the relation of the individual to history.
Moral arguments that rely on appeals to history face the
same difficulties the turn to traditions must overcome.
Someone who is capable of understanding the present as
bearing the legacy of discrimination is a person who is
actively involved in history. History is real. The self
finds itself in a world constituted by the legacy of dis-
crimination and racism. More is involved than an acknowl-
edgment of the consequences discrimination left behind. The
justification of policies that must impose costs on others
as a means of effectively dealing with the legacy of dis-
crimination requires that we discover important aspects of
our selves in a relationship to the past. Otherwise poli-
cies impinging negatively on ourselves are easily resisted.
The issue here is one of what instills a commitment to
social change. Social policy generally and affirmative
has faltered because of a lack ofaction in particular
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political commitment. We see in the policy of affirmative
action how the lack of connectedness to history by under-
mining commitment further undermines social policy. Any
policy addressing the legacy of racial discrimination which
imposes costs faces these same difficulties.
A turn to traditions might also raise issues that
complicate achieving certain social ends such as eliminating
the legacy of discrimination. It is clear from the debate
over affirmative action in higher education that the tradi-
tional autonomy of the university is believed by some to be
threatened by a federally enforced policy of affirmative
action. Competing traditions are called into play because
nearly every member of a university has at least two social
identities. He or she is an American (in most cases) and a
member of a particular university with its own traditions,
including the highly prized tradition of autonomy. The turn
to traditions may not simplify political choices. Alasdair
MacIntyre as we shall see fully expects role conflict. Even
though choice is not made easier, the turn to traditions is
an important step toward bringing out the full dimensions of
the issue in question.
Sheldon Wolin argues that we sell our birthright, our
inheritance and historical i ty , because we wish to be re-
lieved of the burden of coming to terms with the ambiguities
of our inheritance. "Contract" carries with it the idea of
a new beginning, but moreover, a new beginning that begins
by erasing the past. In America our frequent talk (it must
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be frequent because history always takes place, we are
constantly making mistakes and becoming "dirtied") of new
beginnings "absolves us of past wrongs", "washes us clean",
and renders us innocent
.
32 It even makes a certain sense of
equality possible--str ipped of our past we can all enter the
future linked arm in arm. Hence the lack of involvement in
the past is experienced not as a loss but as a relief, a
feeling of freedom, a feeling of unfettered possibility,
which makes hypothetically a type of community possible. It
is only an illusory community because it depends on denying
the on-going reality of our concrete relationships. Inter-
estingly, Wolin clarifies the difference between birthright
and contract with a reference to Richard Hooker . 33
...Wherefore as any man's deed past is good as long as
he himself continueth; so the act of a public society
of men done five hundred years sithence [sic] standeth
as theirs who presently are of the same societies,
because corporations are immortal; we were then alive
in our predecessors, they in their successors do live
still . . .
The rejection of our birthright does more than mark a break
with the historical community, it alters the context of
political action. Again, both words and deeds are made
problematic. Words puzzle because we are no longer engaged
with the traditions of the past and political acts become
ever more perilous because they have lost their enduring
significance. Without the possibility of our deeds living
on in our descendants political acts make little sense.
The rejection of ahistorical individualism brings one back
to immortal society and a Burkean partnership of genera-
tions. As for Hooker, so for
Burke deeds requ
"continueth" beyond the grave in
our immortal
ire that we
community
.
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NOTES
'Bruce James Smith, Politics and Remembrance : Republican
themes in Machiavelli, Burke, and Tocqueville, (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1985), pp . 262-268. In the
republican tradition we find that the "founding" is the
basis of remembrance— the source of "energizing symbols,
images and memories" --and as a consequence the place to
which political actors return for "warmth and inspiration".
Smith believes that in our own time "the legend of the
founding has lost its vitality." However, he ends his book
with a plea for the "the building and rebuilding of institu-
tions capable of preserving and enlarging historical self-
conceptions in which citizens come to see themselves as
carrying the burdens and possessing the possibilities of
stories of which they are a part." Smith turns to a notion
of narrativity reminiscent of MacIntyre. The theoretical
political task becomes one of enabling institutions to
support a setting for the narration of political life.
Smith does not address that task in any concrete manner.
The issue behind his call for new institutions is the very
same issue at the center of this dissertation: How are we
located in traditions?
2Henry F. Beechhold writes that in order to combat our lack
of a "practical historical perspective" we need "political
literacy" . See his "The Presidential Campaign was a
Chilling Indictment of American Education", The Chronicle of
Higher Education
,
(December 7, 1988), sec. B, p. 2.
2I am not endorsing this view of contemporary politics, it
sees the contemporary situation too starkly. See Jeffrey
Stout, Ethics After Babel (Boston: Beacon Press, 1988) for a
corrective to MacIntyre's portrayal of contemporary liberal
politics
.
4The movement for "cultural literacy" is part of this turn
to traditions, though E.D. Hirsch certainly includes more
than what we would call traditions from the past. See his
Cultural Literacy , (New York: Vintage Books, 1988). Com-
plaints about the lack of historical awareness of Americans
are quite common. And so are recommendations that we take
seriously our history. On a philosophical level, the turn
to traditions is a move away from epistemology to hermeneu-
tics, a move from a philosophy of mind to the "hermeneutic
space of communicative practice". See Calvin Schrag, "Sub-
jectivity and Praxis" , in Hermeneutics and Deconstruction
eds. Don Ihde and Hugh J. Silverman (Albany, New York: State
University or New York Press, 1985), and Richard Rorty,
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1979), chapter 7. The quest to understand
the essence of the knowing subject in order to judge what is
30
*nV S n0t knowledge is replaced with viewing conversationas "the ultimate context within which knowledge is to be
understood" which philosophers have without much success
attempted to break out of in order to see "social practices
of justification as more than just such practices". (Rorty,
pp. 389-390.) Instead of epistemology we have a history of
differing social practices of justification, some philo-
sophical some not, all of which make up a "conversation of
mankind" that we ought to continue rather than attempt to
bring to an end. "Edifying philosophy seeks to keep the
conversation going rather than find objective truth" .( Rorty
,
p. 377) Philosophy the way Richard Rorty sees it has no
choice but to turn to the traditions or voices that make up
this conversation of mankind. Rorty is concerned with how
philosophy, in particular epistemology, has acted as a
gatekeeper inhibiting the conversation.
Similarly, Calvin Schrag, writing in response to the
"death of the subject", argues that we can understand human
subjectivity and possibly restore it only against the "back-
drop of conversation, habits, skills and institutional
involvements that line the hermeneutic space of communica-
tive praxis... we cannot escape one's praxis—one's lin-
guistic and institutional engagements". (Schrag, p. 27)
Even as one suspends theoretical judgments about oneself one
must "in the meantime continue to speak, act, work, play,
and assume social roles" . Given the critique of the subject
levied by deconstruction we must search through and work
with the traditions that shape our linguistic and institu-
tional engagements. As we shall see, like MacIntyre and
Walzer, "praxis" is deemed to be inescapable.
In political discourse, besides the recent work of
MacIntyre and Walzer, Charles Taylor, William M. Sullivan
and Ronald Beiner evince an approach that can be termed a
turn to traditions.
Taylor argues that mainstream social science operates
under an ontology that restricts meaning to individual
subjects who may have converging subjective reactions but
who may not share in a belief and have intersub jective
meanings. In thus sub ject ivizing meaning, social science
excludes the "possibility of the communal", "the subject who
can be a "we" as well as an "I". See Charles Taylor,
"Interpretation and the Sciences of Man" in Understanding
and Social Inquiry , Fred Dallmayr and Thomas McCarthy, eds . ,
( Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1977), pp. 122-
123. For his appraisal of Alasdair MacIntyre's After Virtue
see his "Justice after Virtue" in Michael Benedikt and
Rudolf Burger eds. , Kritische Methode und Zukunft der—An-
thropoloqie (Wien: W . Braummuel ler , 1985) p.28. Community is
constituted by intersub ject ive meaning which is located in
the practices we share. Although Taylor's advocacy of
interpretation is largely made in an argument over what
constitutes an adequate explanation of human action, one may
infer that political and moral argument occurs around the
intersub ject ive meanings our sharing in the traditions of
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social practices makes possible. If we fail to stand intraditions we shall not be able to participate in communal
lif e
.
In a somewhat similar vein, William M . Sullivan's
argument for the priority of social relationships over theliberal notion of essentially unrelated individuals seeking
to realize private goals turns to the traditions of civic
republicanism as a way of resuscitating a civic outlook.
William M. Sullivan, Reconstructing Public Philosophy
.(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982), p.179. By
awakening "a living sense of the social and historical
relationships within which we stand", we will become recon-
nected to the tradition of civic republicanism. What
Sullivan seems to have in mind is a renewal of political
protest movements. Populism and more recently the Civil
Rights movement are all episodes in the civic republican
tradition which have residues in our present day social and
historical relationships.
The goal of Political Judgment
,
(Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1983) is the disclosure of a faculty of
judgment that every human being can be said to have in some
way, which Ronald Beiner conceives as that faculty "by which
we situate ourselves in the political world without relying
upon rules." Attunement, "a tacit grasp of the concrete
situation" [see his chapter on Gadamer ] , developed from
practical experience with the matter at hand, is emphasized
in place of a justified set of rules that one applies to a
situation. (For instance see Rawls' A Theory of Justice .)
The possibility of a public judgment (as opposed to sub-
jective judgment) lies in the fact that there are public
things, "a common tradition and shared history, public laws
and obligations to which all are subject, common ideals and
meanings." (Beiner, p.131, p.134, and p.141) Therefore,
public judgments "concern not merely what I want or the way
of life 1^ desire, but rather entail intersub jective deliber-
ation about a common life (how we should live together)."
Arguments about the common life and justifications of our
political judgments take the form of narratives that draw on
our common experience, our history and traditions. Without
public things we have no public realm.
In summary Taylor, Sullivan and Beiner all share a
conviction that intersub ject ive meaning is embodied in
practices, in our concrete political and social world and
that argument, deliberation and justification ought to
proceed from these concrete particulars. In some sense each
defends the position that the individual is antecedently
social and that the image of the free, unencumbered indivi-
dual is radically at odds with our relationship to social
reality. They make it clear that democratic politics de-
pends on the existence of public things and that publicness
results from sharing a history of social practices or tradi-
tions .
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5 ® 1 am re f er ing to the unencumbered self of Rawls
and the contentless self of "negative freedom". See
Frithjof Bergmann, On Being Free (Notre Dame, Indiana and
London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1977). Along simi-
lar lines Charles Taylor has argued that the liberal notion
of negative liberty is often coupled to freedom for self-
dependence, or autonomy, giving rise to a "situationless
freedom". Hegel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1975)
,
p.560.
bergmann, On Being Free
, p.37.
7The underground man experiences his thoughts, feelings, and
desires as something foreign to himself, as something he
cannot identify with nor affirm. His identity consists
solely of a "mere point" surrounding by a "swarm of ele-
ments" craving an outlet. By resisting them he affirms his
self as a mere point. Being something, affirming a
thought, acting on a desire would contradict his content-
less
,
free self.
one’s own free unfettered choice, one’s own caprice,
however wild it may be, one’s own fancy worked up at
times to frenzy— is that very "most advantageous ad-
vantage" ... What man wants is simply independent choice,
whatever that independence may cost and wherever it may
lead
.
Fyodor Dostoevski, Great Short Works of Doestoevski (New
York: Harper and Row, 1968). See also Bergmann, On Being
Free
,
Chapters One and Two.
Q
I am assuming that we would call the underground man
irrational despite the fact that his capriciousness is an
attempt to put into action the emptiness of his self. In a
peculiar way his behavior evinces instrumental rationality.
^Thucydides
,
The Peloponnesian War
,
(Modern Library, 1951),
p . 103 , p . 107
.
10W. Lloyd Warner, "An American Sacred Ceremony", The
American Life, Dream and Reality (Berkeley, 1962), pp . 5-6.
^It is also possible that the grief felt at having lost a
buddy is a more important reason for their refusal to engage
traditions within a debate.
^The power of political speech that refers to the sacri-
fices of life during war is truly impressive. In the NAZI
film. Triumph of the Will , we see Hitler playing on the
feelings of obligation gentians felt toward their recent war
dead. Hitler incites his audience when he declares that
Germany's dead sons and fathers have not really passed away.
They exist in the nation, in Deutschland, and Nazism by
reviving Deutschland will bring the dead back home.
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1 3See Joseph Anthony Amato, Guil
t
arid Gratitude
. (Westport,Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1982), p.19.
14Sheldon Wolin, "Contract and Birthright", Political
Theory, vol.14, no . 2 (May 1986), pp. 179-193.
1 5Geofrey Hartman, ed
. ,
Bitburq in Moral and Political
Perspective
,
(Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University
Press, 1977). See the Introduction.
1
6
"We Must Look Truth Straight In the Eye", President Kurt
von Weizsacker, Bitburg and Beyond
,
ed . Ilya Levkov, (New
York: Shapolsky Publishers, 1987).
17See his article in Ilya Levkov, ed
. ,
Bitburg and Beyond
.
1 8Ignorance of our present world obviously interferes with
accomplishing any goal I seek. A desire to act at all in
the world motivates me to understand it. I am drawing a
simple picture for heuristic purposes of one element in
Weizsacker' s historic speech. I intend no criticism of
Weizsacker
.
1
9
For a study of the German debate over this question see
Charles S. Maier, The Unmasterable Past (Cambridge and
London: Harvard University Press, 1988)
p nTheir world is historically related to the Third Reich.
2 1A craftsman has the tradition of his craft, an artist his
art, a German--the collective narrative of Germany.
p O
^Hans-Georg Gadamer
,
Truth and Method
,
(New York: Crossroad
Publishing Company, 1982). See especially Section Three of
Chapter Two of Part Two.
23Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method , (New York: Crossroad
Publishing Company, 1982), p.324.
24Gadamer, Truth and Me thod, p.324
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Gadamer
,
Truth and Method
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p . 3 2 5
.
2 ®Amy Gutmann, "Communitarian Critics of Liberalism", Phi-
l osophy and Public Affairs , XIV, no . 3 (summer, 1985), 308-
322. John Rawls, "Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory:
The Dewey Lectures 1980", The Journal of Philosophy, LXXVII,
no. 9 ( Sept ., 1980 ) , 515-72. Michael Sandel , Liberalism and
the Limits of Justice , (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press
,
1982 ) .
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Lee Nisbet, "Affirmative Action— A Liberal Program?", in
Barry Gross editor, Reverse Discrimination , (Buffalo:
Prometheus Books, 1977).
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2 8See Miro M. Todorovich and Howard A. Glickstein, "Dis-
crimination in Higher Education: A Debate on Faculty Employ-
ment", in Barry Gross, ed., Reverse Discrimination
,
pp.37-
40 .
2 9 For one, "white male" is a heterogeneous group including
the sons of the KKK
,
recent immigrants who had no part in
our history of racial discrimination.
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John E. Fleming, The Lengthening Shadow of Slavery
,
(Washington: Howard University Press, 1976). See the
Forward
.
8 1 Quoted in Todorovich and Glickstein, "Discrimination in
Higher Education", p.17.
32Sheldon Wolin, "Contract and Birthright", 187.
33Sheldon Wolin, "Contract and Birthright", 188. Original
citation is from Of the Laws of the Ecclesiastical Polity ,
(Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University, 1977-1982),
Vol . 1 , Book x , p . 8
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CHAPTER 2
EDMUND BURKE AND THE DILEMMAS OF ENGAGING TRADITION
Int roduce lan
Burke may have a more compelling explanation of our
situatedness in traditions than contemporary political
theorists have been able to provide us with. I believe he
makes a contribution toward resolving the issue of how the
past can address our present without dominating us. The
essential question is whether the relationship to tradition
we find in Burke is traditionalist in the conservative,
uncritical sense or whether Burke's perspective is com-
patible with and supportive of a critical traditionalism.
In considering the thought of Burke we do best to focus
on his concept of inheritance, his critique of rationalism,
his criticisms of historical inquiry, and his critical
commentary on the "Popery Laws". "Inheritance", I shall
argue, is an emotionally loaded term, drawing on emotions
nurtured within the family. "Inheritance" pulls us toward
the past and compels us to face the future. Filial piety
places me before the world of my father; the natural obliga-
tion to my children forces me to consider the consequences
for their future of what I do in my present. By attacking
rationalism Burke dismisses a certain type of criticism and
thus clarifies his own view of critical inquiry. The argu-
ment against using arguments drawn from history as precepts
of arguments over public policy demonstrate the distinctive-
ness of Burke's retrospective turn to the past. Burke's
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criticism of the "Popery Laws" and his comments on the task
of critical commentary go a long way towards clarifying the
critical edge of his traditionalism.
I mention Burke in connection with "dilemmas of engage-
ment" because my thesis is that we will not find an unam-
biguous and untroubled relationship to tradition in the
thought of Burke. Whereas MacIntyre and Walzer assert a
relationship to traditions and intimate that within tradi-
tions lies a hidden vitality, our reading of Burke will
suggest that our relation to the past may be characterized
by turmoil and tension. I am not suggesting that the pre-
sence of tension and moral complexity in our relation to
traditions undermines the turn to traditions. Taking
seriously and facing up to the complexity of moral reality
and not fleeing it for a easier, more secure and restful
life is no doubt more than half the battle. A political
discourse capable of recognizing the ambiquity of our poli-
tical inheritance will shape a politics that avoids nostal-
gia as it builds on the past.
The ideas of a partnership of generations and an immor-
tal society--in short the idea of a historically constituted
community, a community that looks backwards and forwards
—
unabashedly embraced by Burke also resonate in the work of
MacIntyre and Walzer. It seems likely that Burke can help
us determine the ingredients of a partnership that binds
generations
.
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Perhaps the most compelling reason for turning to the
thought of Edmund Burke is his ambiguous position on whether
it is appropriate or even possible to inquire into the
meaning of traditions. He can be read and often is read as
having reiterated the position of the common law lawyers of
the 17th century who maintained that custom or tradition has
its justification by virtue of its long usage. 1 Showing the
antiquity of custom conferred legitimacy. Alasdair
MacIntyre seems to accept this reading of Burke. MacIntyre
dismisses Burke with the statement, "when a tradition be-
comes Burkean it is always dying or dead"
.
2 He understands
Burkean position to be one that rejects the possibility of
reasoning about traditions. Burkean traditions are beyond
the reach of reason and are essentially stable over time.
In contrast, MacIntyre argues that a vital tradition em-
bodies "continuities of conflict" and an argument about the
good the tradition seeks to realize.
In a similar vein, Bruce James Smith makes a strong
case for reading Burke as someone who sought a "return to
the premodern mind" , a "mind free from memorable innova-
tion." 3 In Smith's estimation Burke sought to rid "politics
of the deed and deny to men remembrance." 4 Custom, far from
being constituted by remembrances of the past, owed its
effectiveness to the decay of memory and its quality of
originating in a time out of mind. Awareness of the changes
customs undergo breaks the spell of continuity with the
past, with the world of our fathers. Once the seams of the
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web are revealed and we are no longer oblivious to the
history of traditions tradition can no longer rest on a
habit of deference. Arguments about the meaning of tradi-
tions then become significant, as does the possibility of a
political deed, a departure from precedent. Smith empha-
sizes the fear Burke had of ambitious men (and modernity's
release of ambition) to the extent that Burke's project is
understood as primarily designed to constrain the possibili-
ties of political action. His goal was to place action "in
the presence of the canonized fathers"--so that "the spirit
of freedom... is tempered with an awful gravity ". 5 We shall
begin then with an interpretation of Burke which places him
in the tradition of the common lawyers and their celebrated
"ancient constitution".
Burke and the Ancient Constitution
J.G.A. Pocock characterizes Burke's ant i -rat ional ism as
denying individual reason the ability to understand the
process by which institutions and laws slowly adapt to
changing conditions . 5 The process of change is a rational
process that we, however, cannot fully comprehend with our
individual reason. Pocock argues that Burke did not develop
his position simply in reaction to the rationalist political
theory of his day. His thought has roots in the common law
view of the basis of English law. Pocock begins his
analysis with one of the most cited passages from Burke's
7corpus
:
The third head of right, asserted by the pulpit of the
Old Jewry, namely, the right to form a government by
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ourselves', has, at least, as little countenance from
any thing done at the Revolution, either in precedent
or in principle, as the two first of their claims. The
Revolution was made to preserve our ant ient indisput-
able laws and liberties, and that ant ient constitution
of government which is our only security for law and
liberty. If you are desirous of knowing the spirit of
our constitution, and the policy which predominated in
that great period which has secured it to this hour,
pray look for both in our histories, in our records, in
our acts of parliament, and journals of parliament, and
not in the sermons of the Old Jewry, and the after-
dinner toasts of the Revolution Society. In the former
you will find other ideas and another language. Such a
claim is ill-suited to our temper and wishes as it is
unsupported by any appearance of authority. The very
idea of the fabrication of a new government is enough
to fill us with disgust and horror. We wished at the
period of the Revolution
,
and do now wish, to derive
all we possess as an inheritance from our forefathers .
Upon that body and stock of inheritance we have taken
care not to inoculate any cyon alien to the nature of
the original plant. All the reformations we have
hitherto made, have proceeded upon the principle of
reference to antiquity; and I hope, nay I am persuaded,
that all those which possibly may be made hereafter,
will be carefully formed upon analogical precedent,
authority and example.
Our oldest reformation is that of Magna Charta.
You will see that Sir Edward Coke, that great oracle of
our law, and indeed all the great men who follow him,
to Blackstone, are industrious to prove the pedigree of
our liberties. They endeavor to prove, that the
ant ient charter, the Magna Charta of King John, was
connected with another positive charter from Henry I
,
and that both the one and the other were nothing more
than a re-affirmance of the still more antient standing
law of the kingdom. In the matter of fact, for the
greater part, these authors appear to be in the right;
perhaps not always; but if the lawyers mistake in some
particulars, it proves my position still the more
strongly; because it demonstrates the powerful prepos-
session towards antiquity, with which the minds of all
our lawyers and legislators, and of all the people whom
they wish to influence, have been always filled; and
the stationary policy of this kingdom in considering
their most sacred rights and franchises as an in-
heritance .
Burke asserts that the English as a matter of habit justify
their laws with appeals to their history which they accept
and treat as their inheritance. He does not claim that
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English law can in fact be .justified with appeals to their
antiquity. The "spirit of the constitution" is the English
"prepossession" towards the constitution. The "stationary
policy" of the English is their willingness to defer to
antiquity which Burke explains with the concept of in-
heritance. Rather than quarrel with the common lawyers
Burke desires above all to distance his view of the Revolu-
tion of 1688 from the interpretation given to it by John
Locke. The revolution was emphatically not conducted, as
John Locke claimed, on the basis of the principle that the
people have the right to "erect a new form... as they think
good.
"
8
In the second paragraph, Burke gives a qualified
endorsement to the habitual regard the English have for
their laws and liberties. However, he distances his own
view of the antiquity of English law from that of the
lawyers, which expresses some doubt over their understand-
ing. The "prepossession" toward antiquity is not rationally
defended in exactly the way the lawyers think. 3 Burke,
however, seems to agree in general with the historical
arguments of the common lawyers. Precedent supports the
constitution. In a speech written but never delivered Burke
stated in no uncertain terms that the English constitution
is "a prescriptive constitution; it is a constitution whose
1
0
sole authority is that it has existed time out of mind".
In this passage Burke rejects the idea that historical
analysis supports the constitution in the way envisioned by
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the common lawyers
.
11 As proof Burke offers the observation
that disputes over the origin of institutions and laws are
"not yet concluded, and never near becoming so". Arguments
about the origin of a law can never give law an authorita-
tive basis. If this is so, what then secures the institu-
tions of government and the rights of Englishmen? "Pre-
scription" entails a presumption in favor of any "settled
scheme of government against any untried project, that a
nation has long existed and flourished under it." Burke
does distinguish prescription from presumption by showing
that they have differing grounds of authority in the human
mind. Clearly, the presumption for a settled scheme
captures only part of the rationale encompassed in prescrip-
tion.
Burke goes on to state that a settled scheme of
government which is in good working order is far better than
"any sudden and temporary arrangement by actual election"
.
In other words, we ought to respect our inherited laws more
than the results of our conscious efforts to devise laws, at
least as long as we are flourishing under our inheritance.
If presumption tends to suggest we ought to subject our
inheritance to some sort of utilitarian measure: Are we
"flourishing" or have we stagnated or declined? Prescrip-
tive authority rests ultimately on a reverence for The
wisdom embodied in our inheritance. It is not an irrational
1
2
reverence
.
...a nation is not an idea of only of local extent, and
individual momentary aggregation; but it is an idea ot
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continuity, which extends in time as well as in numbers
and in space. And this is a choice, not of one day, or
one set of people, not a tumultuary and giddy choice;
it is a deliberate election of ages and generations; it
is a constitution made by what it ten thousand times
better than choice, it is made by the peculiar cir-
cumstances, occasions, tempers, dispositions, and
moral, civil and social habitudes of the people, which
disclose themselves only in a long space of time. It
is a vestment, which accommodates itself to the body.
Nor is prescription of government formed upon blind,
unmeaning pre judices--f or man is a most unwise and a
most wise being. The individual is foolish; the
multitude, for the moment, is foolish, when they act
without deliberation; but the species is wise, and when
time is given to it, as a species it always acts right.
Here Burke seems to believe that the wisdom embodied in the
nation is inscrutable to our reason. We can only ask, does
the vestment fit the body? From Pocock's extended analysis
we can conclude that the arrival among radical reformers of
the idea that the constitution needed to return to its
original principles and the endless debate engendered by an
emphasis on original principles forced Burke to reconsider
the possibility of historical inquiry. (The problem with
historical analysis will be taken up in the section on
historical inquiry.) In conclusion, Burke rejected both
natural right theories and arguments that turn on finding
original meanings. Where does that leave social criticism?
Let us begin by examining his argument against rationalism,
a particular type of criticism.
Burke and the Critique of Rationalism
Burke wrote in opposition to a way of thinking about
politics that has been characterized in our day as "ratio-
nalism ". 13 Burke described wrong-headed political thinking
with a variety of expressions. The terms "abstract",
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"theoretical", "mechanical", "mathematical", and "meta-
physical" are sprinkled throughout his works, always
denoting misconceived politics. 14 His criticisms boil down
to the following claims:
!•) The great advantage of abstract thinking, which is
simplicity, is realized only when we severely restrict what
comes before the mind's eye. However, "abstract perfection"
is a "practical defect" because human affairs are neces-
sarily intricate and the "objects of society are of the
greatest possible complexity." 15
2.
) Abstract reasoning takes us out of our feelings;
thinking abstractly is a state of mind in which our feelings
are distanced. Ironically, when we distance ourselves from
our feelings we invite in socially destructive passions.
3.
) Burke describes the process of abstraction as "the
infinite void of the conjectural world." 17 The infinity of
the life of abstract thought is at odds with the practical
nature of politics.
The first claim raises the issue of the nature of
political reality while the second and third claims chal-
lenge the view that political judgment requires neutrality
or "distance" from the subject of political questions. The
three are obviously related. It is because political
reality is "complex" that the practice of considering human
affairs abstractly is harmful. We shall focus on the first
claim. Theoretical reason leads us into a blind alley
because
:
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All government, indeed every human benefit and enjoy-
ment, every virtue, and every prudent act, is founded
on compromise and barter. We balance inconveniences;
we give and take; we remit some rights that we may
enjoy others; and we choose rather to be happy citizens
that subtle disputants. °
If our institutions, social practices and even our virtues
are founded on compromise, then the search for abstract
principles will turn up nothing but evidence of theoretical
contradiction and the failure to put ideals fully into
practice. Clearly, political institutions and virtues are
ambiguous achievements, moral conflict (a conflict of
"goods") lies at their core. Their benefits and their
contribution to human happiness require striking a positive
balance in a situation that only offer a mix of negative and
positive consequences. The achievement of something purely
good is not possible.
Burke is arguing more than just the view that because
political institutions have developed incrementally over a
long period they are necessarily admixtures of good and
evil, a complicated structure of numerous attempts, often
working at cross-purposes, to solve historically specific
problems. The impurities of politics, the necessity of
political compromise, cannot be blamed.
There is not, there never was, a principle of govern-
ment under the heaven that does not , in the very
pursuit of the good it proposes, naturally and in-
evitably lead into some inconveniences, which makes it
absolutely necessary to counterwork and weaken the
application of that first principle itself.
There is, by the essential fundamental constitution of
things a radical infirmity in all human contrivances;
and the weakness is often so attached to the very
perfection of our political mechanism that some defect
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in i t--something that stops short of its principle
—
something that controls, that mitigates, that moderatesit—becomes a necessary corrective to the evils that
the theoretic perfection would produce.
It is not by historic accident that institutions are
complex. The explanation for the infirmity of our con-
trivances lies ultimately in the irreducible complexity of
social and moral reality.
Not surprisingly, the difficulties of political action
amidst complexity is an argument for respecting settled
schemes. Since experience of social complexi ty--of what
causes conveniences and inconveniences-- is the only source
of social knowledge, given the individual's inability to
experience very much, we ought to avail ourselves of the
"general bank and capital of nations, and of ages ." 20
This critique of our reasoning powers fits in rather
well with his notion of prescriptive authority. One
wonders, where does this leave our minds, our active powers
of reason? Is doing justice simply a matter of conforming
to the requirements of the traditions— that general bank of
nations and of ages?
We can put Burke's traditionalism in proper perspective
if we examine some of the traditions he so much admires.
What Burke celebrates as the wisdom bequeathed to us from
our ancestors includes a set of institutions that allow for
O 1
change
.
Nothing is more beautiful in the theory of parliament
than that principle or renovation, and union of
permanence and change . . . in our changes we are never
wholly old nor wholly new;... there are enough of the
old to preserve the unbroken traditionary chain of the
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maxims and policies of our ancestors, and the law and
custom of parliament; and enough of the new to in-
vigorate us and bring us to our true character
,
by
being taken fresh from the mass of the people; and the
whole, though mostly composed of old members, have,
notwithstanding, a new character ...( my emphasis)
Elsewhere he writes in a similar vein that;
...there is a perpetual treaty and compromise going on,
sometimes openly, sometimes with less observat ion . . . i
t
will always be a matter of curious investigation to
discover the secret of this mutual imitation. ^2
"Mutual imitation" refers to how each part of the constitu-
tion limits and controls the others. Although we cannot
penetrate the "secret" we reap the benefits of having a
politics in which treaty and compromise occur. In other
words, the wisdom of our ancestors is evident in the
beneficial consequences their institutions produce for us.
Explaining how and why it works is not necessary in order to
appreciate the wisdom the institution encourages.
The theory of parliament is a process in which the old
and new mix to form a renewal of the traditional. Here we
have an interpretive process in which the "old" is addressed
and confronted as well as the "new". At least within
parliament we do not merely appreciate the benefits that
have been given to us by way of inheriting a constitution.
We come to know that wisdom, the maxims and policies of our
ancestors. It alone does not give us our "true character".
Some sort of synthesis of traditions and the present is
suggested, otherwise a union of "permanence and change"
would not be possible. The complexity of human affairs
derails "rationalism" but it does not prevent us from
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learning something about the "bank of ages". His under-
standing of how parliament works to blend the old with the
new shows us that questions about the meaning of traditions
must be raised. His incremental understanding of reform
saves him from having to know the bank of ages in complete
detail. The "house" has been built; we never need to
rebuild from the foundation up. That Burke is aiming for
some kind of synthesis of the past and the present in order
to appropriately apply traditions comes out clearly in his
criticism of the use of history in political argument.
Burke and the Critique of Historical Inquiry
Burke states clearly that historical inquiry, defined
as the attempt to cull lessons from history which may then
be applied to current events, is not to be confused with
wisdom. Having wisdom requires primarily the ability to
meet the challenges of exceptional situations. Someone who
sees the present in terms of recurrences is not likely to
address adequately a new problem or situation. As Burke
emphatically put it, "God forbid that we should attempt to
be wise by precedent." Burke juxtaposed to a knowledge of
history the notion that the true principles of politics are
those of "morality enlarged ". 23 These principles "are not
formed out of events and characters, either present or
past." "History is a preceptor of prudence not of prin-
ciples . "
Where do principles come from? Not from history,
although history has something to teach us about prudent
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action. History informs prudence but prudence requires more
than a history lesson in order to be wisdom--which is to say
that the wisdom of our ancestors is not accessible to us
when we strive to imitate them. We cannot copy down their
wisdom, codify it, and then apply it. Principles are
"living" and productive", whereas case studies culled from a
study of history are "dead things" which have little bearing
on the aspects of contemporary life which are unique . 24
Prudence in new cases can do nothing on grounds of
retrospect. A constant vigilance and attention to the
train of things as they successfully emerge, and to act
on what they direct, are the only sure courses.
However, not everything is in flux. Prudence combines "the
principles of original justice with the infinite variety of
human concerns ." 25
Circumstances perpetually variable, dissecting a moral
prudence and discretion, the general principles of
which never vary, must alone prescribe a conduct
fitting on such occasions *. 26
Thus the principles of original justice never vary and yet
they are "living and productive". The principles of
original justice are also the principles of an enlarged
morality. In this latter sense justice is both productive,
open to change and "constant". General principles are
inadequate guides to just and wise action but still have
significance because of their relation to experience of the
past. Principles are inadequate because they are unrelated
to novel events.
As we have noted above, Burke grew disenchanted with
political debate which took its bearings from a reading of
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history, particularly when a reading of history was used to
assert the original intent of an institution, a social
practice, or tradition.-^ Frequently Burke's alleged
restrictive notion of epistemology is cited. We simply
cannot know the grounds and the reasons constituting the
wisdom of our inheritance
.
28 In the following passage Burke
notes a negative consequence of the tendency to look
backwards into the past for wisdom. He sharply attacks
"historical patriotism" for its indolent s imple-minded-
ness .
^
...many a stern republican, after gorging himself with
a full feast of admiration of the Grecian commonwealths
and of our true Saxon constitution, and discharging all
the splendid bile of his virtuous indignation of King
John and King James, sits down perfectly satisfied to
the coarsest work and homeliest job of the day he lives
in
.
He goes on to add, "historical patriotism" is a "thing[s] of
wonderful convenience" . The historical patriot in his
reverie sleeps through the important concerns of the day.
In his action the stern republican is no different from the
most abject servant of the kingdom. The traditionalist
loves the past without being able to see the relationship of
past to present. He is blind to the differences that
distinguish the present from the past. The traditionalist
fails to see the relation of present to the past because a
nostalgia for the past takes the place of "a constant
vigilance and attention to the train of things as they
successfully emerge." Although Burke firmly links an
awareness of the present to understanding the past , ^he look
backwards, is not a turn to a history book of recorded
happenings, nor is it a set of case studies, a list of
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precedents, or maxims handed down to us. Rather, Burke's
turn backward toward the past is an introspective turn
towards the prejudices that structure our self-understand-
ing. Looking backwards to the ancestors amounts to placing
our inherited concepts, categories, and tradit ions--our pre-
judgments in Gadamer 1 s sense—under the pressure of an
inquiry that attends closely to newly emerging events.
Looking backward to the ancestors requires that we renew the
question of what is right and just (this is the meaning of
the imperative that we enlarge our sense of morality) . We
must also be oriented toward receiving that question and
understanding the answers our ancestors gave. Being pulled
toward the world of one's ancestors is a prerequisite to
"looking backward ". 30
Elsewhere Burke warns that the preference for things
old and for the past is often the result of comparing the
faults of the present age which lie right before us to an
ideal image of the past whose problems are conveniently
forgotten. 3 ^ Burke is, I think, making a distinction that
the turn to traditions must consider.
To look back searchingly for the wisdom of the past is
not the key to actions that are "practical" and are grounded
in our inheritance. The penchant for history, for finding
truth and "right" in the lives of our ancestors, can blind
us just as surely as the infinite conjectures of theoretical
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reason. In interpreting Burke we must face squarely a
particular dilemma: respect for the gift of our inheritance
necessitates a presumption that our ancestors had wisdom but
that this wisdom is both incomplete and inactive if we
passively accept the gift. The arguments of Bruce James
Smith and Paul Lucus which stress Burke's antipathy to
inquiry into our inheritance are off the mark for two
reasons. Burke's notion of inheritance contains the
ingredients of an orientation towards the past which is not
traditionalist. 0 ^ Burke's concept of justice is not an
apologia for tradition. In fact his notion of justice
demands that we put pressure on our traditions.
Burke's frequent uncompromising statements on prescrip-
tive authority ("the sole basis of our constitution") ought
to be read against the backdrop of statements which run in
the opposing direction. To cite just one example, Burke
sometimes explains what he means by "prescription" in very
practical terms. He links belief in prescription to a just
political order, valuing the consequences of the belief
3 3higher than the question concerning its truth.
I am in trust religiously to maintain the rights and
properties of all descriptions of people in the
possession which legally they hold; and in the rule by
which alone they can be secure in any possession. I do
not find myself at liberty either as a man, or as a
trustee for men, to take a vested property from one
man, and to give it to another, because I think that
the portion of one is too great, and that of another
too smal 1 . .
.
The calling of men by the names of "pampered and
luxurious prelates", etc., is in you no more than a
mark of your dislike to intemperance ... but in others it
is used for other purposes. It is often used to
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extinguish the sense of justice in our minds, and
natural feelings of humanity in our bosoms.
Burke is not merely citing religious faith on behalf of
prescription. He is linking an attitude of mind, that of
respecting the possessions of others to our sense of
justice, implying that those who do not respect the property
of others also falsely accuse others of being "pampered"
.
The enemies of property endanger the sense of justice within
the community. Rather than define justice simply in terms
of prescription, Burke is subordinating prescription to
justice. Respecting prescriptive authority is not the
essence of justice. Before taking up the question of
justice and social criticism within Burke's thought, we
shall examine the critical space within what I consider to
be Burke's most significant concept, that of inheritance.
Burke and the Concept of Inheritance
Inheritance is a concept that occupies a central place
in Burke's political philosophy. It links Burke to the
efforts of MacIntyre and Walzer to situate us in traditions.
It is through the idea of inheritance that Burke attempts to
evoke a sense of our dependence on the past in terms of a
moral obligation not to squander the gift given to us by our
parents and ancestors. On a basic level our inheritance is
simply a set of prejudices that we have grown into.
"Inheritance" is more than the physical property passed down
from one generation to the next. We shall see that Burke
understood our inheritance to include ideas and attitudes ot
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mind. As we would for the sake of our children improve our
property so must we improve our culture.
Burke described the English as a people of "untaught
feeling", who instead of casting away all the old pre-
judices, "cherish them to a considerable degree", and even
cherish them "because they are prejudices.""^ Burke is
attributing to the English character a fondness for the
local and particular. For it is only at the level of the
family and neighborhood where we can speak of untaught
feelings— feelings that grew into us, so to speak, as we
matured from child to adult. Burke is affirming the
relation of affection and love with the particular and
local, but within an argument that ties these "prejudices"
to broader publics.
To be attached to the subdivision, to love the little
platoon we belong to in society, is the first principle
(the germ as it were) of public affections. It is the
first link in the series by which we proceed towards a
love to our country, and to mankind.
In other words, the prejudice for the local is only the
beginning of developing an understanding of public things,
of a public philosophy. Burke is not maintaining that local
understandings and concepts, what we might call our initial
prejudices, should never be altered.
Elsewhere Burke writes, "No cold relation is a zealous
citizen." Burke explains:
We pass on to our neighbourhoods, and our habitual
provincial connexions. These are inns and resting
places. Such divisions of our country as have been
formed by habit, and not by a sudden jerk of authority,
were so many little images of the great country in
which the heart found something which it could fill.
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Larry Adams has described this process of political matura-
tion which begins in the family and culminates in a love
felt toward mankind as "a series of enlarging affections".^
As we move from family and town to the inns which lie at the
crossroads of towns our moral life is enlarged as it takes
in and considers the views of others who are at first
strangers but who become part of a place a "heart could
f ill" .
Prejudices ought to be thought of as building blocks of
involvements that take us beyond the "local", beyond our
first "home". Political and moral education necessitates a
transformation of our initial political/moral moorings.
However, Burke, as we shall see, intimates that we must
never reject our birthplace nor break our initial bonds of
affection. Any enlarged affections must give earlier
understandings due consideration and due respect.
"No cold relation is a zealous citizen" sums up Burke's
understanding nicely. Political life depends on a love of
public things and respect for the laws and political
traditions that constitute political life. Only someone who
has experienced the loving warmth of family life will
participate in politics with wisdom. For the "warm rela-
tions", politics becomes a family affair requiring a defense
of the ancestral inheritance and a series of enlarging
affections
.
There are several compelling reasons for why family
relationships ought to be important for the character of the
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relationships we form in the world beyond the family. If no
initial attachment is made in childhood one may find forming
affective relationships latter in life extremely difficult.
The family is an agent of socialization, a place where
morality is taught and individual desires are curbed. The
political order is obviously dependent on the family in this
way. However, the family (we ought to be thinking of an
extended family) is no mere school for national politics.
The prejudice for one's family motivates one to see the past
as an inheritance. The family is not just the place where
the individual's sense of self is enlarged; it is aiso the
place that nurtures a respect and love for the accomplish-
ments of one's ancestors. The individual is lifted out of
the present to face the past by way of the emotional forces
constituting the family. Moral development for Burke is not
just a matter of growing outward beyond the local and
particular. Vital is the retrospective turn which by
putting us in touch with the world of our fathers involves
us in the complexity of our moral, political world which is,
of course, a product of history.
As we elaborate Burke's notion of inheritance and
consider the political relevance of the 'family", we will
discover that Burke did not believe family life to be
innocent of internal conflicts. Nor did he think that our
inheritance was somehow a "pure", unambiguous good. We
may also add that binding politics to the emotional storms
and stresses of the family may prove to have liabilities for
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a critical traditionalism. These may range from a fear of
criticizing the 'fathers" to an overwhelming desire to be
rid of the fathers above all else.
Inheritance plays on the natural feelings we have
toward our family, our father and mother, our grandparents.
Inheritance evokes feelings that motivate responsibility and
an obligation to live up to what we have been given.
Minimally, we should not waste their gift. Better, would be
to add to the gift for the sake of future generations. The
love for one's parents may include an obligation to under-
take actions which do justice to their memory. The desire
not to be ashamed before one's parents may cause an in-
ability to depart from the ways of the ancestors, a paraly-
sis before the "canonized fathers" as Bruce James Smith
noted in his critical commentary on Burke. That Burke did
not hold this view is clear from his writings and from his
life.
Burke rejected the career his father preferred without
cutting himself off emotionally from his father. Even as we
strike out on our own we find that our parents cannot be
ignored. When estranged from them we seek reconciliation.
Burke, although he reportedly called himself a son fleeing
his father, never broke off his relationship and made
several efforts to obtain his father's consent to his choice
of profession.^ Further evidence for the significance of
the family for understanding the concept of inheritance is
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found in a well-known passage in which Burke eontasts
relationships founded on consent from those based on duty.
Dark and inscrutable are the ways by which we come into
the world. The instincts which give rise to this
mysterious process of nature are not of our making.
But out of physical causes, unknown to us, perhaps
unknowable, arise moral duties, which, as we are able
perfectly to comprehend, we are bound indispensably to
perform ... consent ing or not, they (the parents) are
bound to a long train of burthensome duties towards
those with whom they have never made a convention of
any sort. Children are not consenting to their
relation, but their relation, without their actual
consent, binds them to its duties; or rather it implies
their consent because the presumed consent of every
rational creature is in unison with the predisposed
order of things ... power ful instincts make this duty
clear . .
.
40
We come into the world not as individuals choosing our
commitments but as a member of a family, bound to a par-
ticular order of generation. Our instinctual love--this
prejudice-- for our parents carries with it the sense that we
are in debt to them. Our affection for our family reveals
that we have moral obligations and duties toward members of
our family. These obligations bind and extend across
generations
.
Of course, the introduction of familial affections as
the source of obligation opens many possible possible
orientations towards the past—as many as there are at-
titudes towards family relations. In addition to the desire
to justify oneself to one's parents— to do one's name proud-
-there is the heavier burden of redeeming the sacrifices and
sorrows of the parents' lives. The feeling of guilt ior not
adequately paying back to the parents the gifts received and
Treating traditionsthe sacrifices made is not uncommon.
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as an inheritance goes far beyond simply respecting the
elders to a deeper obligation (and entanglement), one which
extends to define an entire self, giving purpose (and
supplying burdens) that draws one into the past as it sends
one out into the future. We might say that for Burke
receiving the gift of inheritance is the duty of a good son.
To give the gift to the next generation is the duty of a
good father. But in fact the situation is hardly this
simple . 41
For instance, if the ancestors were victims, their
children may believe that they have obligation to seek
revenge. The politics of traditions would be colored by a
quest for vengeance. If the ancestors were, on the other
hand, guilty of some crime, their children might seek to
acquit the debt of the ancestors. They would be in the
difficult situation of acknowledging the guilt of their
parents while still loving them. One can find support for
at least four different types of relationships in Burke's
writings. In the "soft version", respect for our inheritance
restrains us but never to the point of interfering with
justice. The look backward to our ancestors means that we
seek always to improve upon the past in a spirit of respect
for the wisdom of what has passed the test of time. The
habit of respect and deference to the world of our fathers
and mothers supports the habit of considering not our
immediate wants and desires but the future prospects of our
59
children. Our feelings towards are ancestors are rather
unambiguous
.
An exactly opposite interpretation of Burke has been
articulated by Bruce James Smith. For him, Burke's fathers
are likely to be the "canonized fathers" and constitution
solely a "prescriptive constitution "
,
42 The fathers are
good and great (their portraits hang over us in the halls of
our rooms) and we are little--humbled men— in comparison.
A number of variations is obviously possible. If fear
replaces gratitude for the gift of our inheritance, we are
not simply humbled, we are enthralled by our great ances-
tors. Again quoting Smith paraphrasing Burke, our freedom
is tempered with an "awe-ful gravity" . In this interpreta-
tion the ancestors are part of the "great mysterium of
nature". If they are "sublime", they strike terror into
us . 43
A variation of the soft version would note that we
continue traditions so as not to disappoint the "old man" .
Wanting the love and affection of our parents draws us into
defending their world and their understandings . 44 Respect
might actually be tied to feelings of pity or the desire not
to abandon one's parents because they have so little.
In reading Burke one finds evidence for several of
these type of family relationships. We know from Burke s
private life that he took very seriously his obligation to
his son and keenly felt the burden of his relationship to
his father. Probably in reaction to the domineering
influence his own father tried to exercise over him he
argued that parents are "made for their children and not
60
children for them"
. After a certain time parents ought to
slide out of life, and let the children gradually into the
succession. 11 ^5
Burke also felt how much children meant to their
parents. The "tender satisfaction" of being a parent is the
"only indemnification" one has for "all his cares and
sorrows"
.
46 We can see how the look backward to the ances-
tors may include moral obligation to heal the parent of his
cares and sorrows. Even if the father is not to be canon-
ized we would only with great reluctance alienate his
affections and deprive him of his only "indemnification".
That Burke willingly alienated his father when he gave
up legal studies shows he did not understand the obligation
to the past to necessitate subordination of son to father.
One may flee the father's house without rejecting the
"inheritance". Of course, one must return home. One will
return home to the house of one's father, love and duty
require no less, but never on terms dictated by the father.
Burke returned home only after intermediaries softened the
elder Burke's hostility and only after his father gave
symbolic approval to Burke's literary pursuits.
If we treat Burke's relationship with his father as
paradigmatic for how we ought to relate to our inheritance,
then we can argue that although love and duty forces us to
look backward to the past, we nevertheless find that we must
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leave home—we cannot live for the past but only for the
present and for the future. Finally, we must return home;
but this means finding a way of making good our obligation
without sacrificing our individuality. Our world is
different from the world of our fathers. In terms of making
wise policy decisions we can say with Burke that stale
precedent and case studies are a poor substitute for active
and living principles that address the uniqueness of the
present
.
Burke's most extended statement on inheritance supports
the view that our appropriation of our inheritance is in
fact an appropriation and not a repetition or imitation of
the father's world.
...it has been the uniform policy of our constitution
to claim and assert our liberties, as an entailed
inheritance derived to us from our forefathers . .
.
...This policy appears to me to be the result of
profound reflection; or rather the happy effect of
following nature, which is wisdom without reflection,
and above it. A spirit of innovation is generally the
result of a selfish temper, and confined views. People
will not look forward to posterity, who never look
backward to their ancestors. Besides the people of
England well know that the idea of inheritance
furnishes a sure principle of conservation, and a sure
principle of transmission; without at all excluding a
principle of improvement. It leaves acquisition free;
but it secures what it acquires. Whatever advantages
are obtained by a state proceeding on these maxims, are
locked fast as in a sort of family settlement . .
.
working after the pattern of nature we receive, we
hold, we transmit our government, and our privileges,
in the same manner we enjoy and transmit our property
and our lives . The institutions of policy, the goods
of fortune, the gifts of Providence, are handed to us
in the same course and order
.
The passage establishes that Burke conceived of the rela-
tionship to past in terms of family life. By "following
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nature" and acting on our natural feelings of obligation we
look backward to our ancestors. But looking to family life
in ways that go beyond what Burke's explicit use of the idea
is also appropriate. Literally "inheritance" refers to
physical goods like wealth and land. When Burke says that
the "goods of fortune, the gifts of providence, and institu-
tions of policy" are transmitted in the "same course and
order" as an inheritance from parent to descendent
,
the
concept of inheritance is stretched to include goods which
must be understood in order to be passed down from one
generation to the next. One final quote illustrating the
connection between the family and inheritance testifies to
the extent to which Burke linked politics and remembrance to
the affections of family life.
...In this choice of inheritance we have given to our
frame of politics the image of a relation in blood;
binding up the constitution of our country with our
dearest domestic ties; adopting our fundamental laws
into the bosom of our family affections; keeping
inseparable, and cherishing with the warmth of all
their combined and mutually reflected charities, our
state, our hearths, our sepulchers, and our altars . 49
In this passage Burke allows for criticism, but only within
the "family"--in other words, a restrained criticism which
seeks to perfect the inheritance.
Let us improve it with zeal, but with fear. Let us
follow our ancestors, men not without a rational,
though without an exclusive confidence in themselves;
who by respecting the reason of others, who by looking
backward as well as forward, by the modesty as well as
by the energy of their minds, went on, insensibly
drawing this constitution nearer and nearer to its
perfection, by never departing from its fundamental
principles
,
nor introducing any amendment which had not
a subsisting root in the laws, the constitution, and
usages of the kingdom . 50
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As I have suggested the possibilities of criticism within
the family depend very much upon the character of those
family relationships. If we take the soft version as our
guide we can say that Burkean social criticism requires that
we first seek to understand our ancestors before we commence
with criticism. "Respecting the reason of others" denotes
an open attitude of mind and a willingness to suspend
disbelief. Not surprisingly, Burke maintains we ought to
venerate where "we are not presently able to understand"
.
Notice also that the ancestors looked backward as well as
forward; they did not have an "exclusive confidence in
themselves". Such men would not expect their sons to abide
without deviation to their decisions.
An examination of Burke as a social critic builds an
even stronger case for the soft version, or something close
to it. However, whatever position we eventually ascribe to
Burke will not affect the more general question of the
character of a relationship to traditions which is mediated
through the emotive life of the family. The specific
obligations such traditions convey will depend on particular
historical events. To take a simple example, what if
Burke's ancestors had been Nazis? The relation to tradi-
tion— the look backward—would be dramatically different.
The English chewing their cud around the great oak tree of
the constitution would receive a strikingly different
interpretation by a "guilty" son.^
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Burke as a Socia l Cr itic
We have seen how the space for the criticism of
traditions within Burkean traditionalism is threatened by
filial piety, though we have also seen that standing before
the sepulchers of ancestors does not rule out improving our
inheritance nor reconsidering our inheritance.^ It is
therefore time to look more closely at Burke the social
critic. We can outlined Burke's concept of justice
according to the following precepts:
1
.
) We cannot act wisely by acting according to
precedent. "God forbid that we attempt to be wise according
to precedent". Burke argues that case studies and the
precedents derived from them fail to address new situations.
2.
) Arguments for justice on the grounds of original
principles or original intent are generally speaking
interminable. We will never agree on who had first posses-
sion or on what original principle underlies a given
institution. The search for "truth" is not to be confused
with justice. Even if we could discover or settle on an
interpretation of original intent we must question whether
settling this issue has any bearing on justice. We shall
see that Burke did nonetheless criticize "titles" and
specific property rights.
3.
) At the same time Burke speaks of the "principles of
original justice, meaning however, not a fixed standard but
rather the principle of an enlarged morality which is living
and productive yet constant--i . e . , "original".
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4.
) Essential to acting justly is a "troublesome
application", the willingness to extend our sympathy to
others, and an attentiveness to the conseguences of our own
feelings and prejudices.
5.
) Our judgment will be misled unless we must watch
the operation of our feelings (including our prejudices). 54
The rejection of the search for truth is part of
Burke's attempt to bring the quest for justice in close
alignment with the complexity of political reality.
The practical consequences of any political tenet go a
great way in deciding upon its value. Political
problems do not primarily concern truth or falsehood.
They relate to good or evil. What in the result is
likely to produce evil, is politically false; that
which is productive of good, politically true. 55
Truthseeking is a habit of mind that fails to grasp the
wisdom of compromising principles and working with mixtures
of good and evil. It tends towards extremes in order to
remain pure in concept
.
Questions concerning title, who really deserves to have
what and how much, detract from real, answerable questions
of abuse and evils. 56
When I first came into a public trust, I found your
parliament in possession of an unlimited legislative
power over the colonies. I could not open the statute
book, without seeing the actual exercise of it, more or
less, in all cases whatsoever. This possession passed
with me for a title. It does so in all human affairs.
No man examines into the defects of his title to his
paternal estate, or to his established government.
Burke is objecting to criticism which begins with the broad
question of just title. Burke would oppose any notion of
distributive economic justice which attempted to distribute
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income according to some ideal pattern. But he is far from
rejecting a narrowly defined question directed toward a
specific abuse. Burke's shift in attitude toward the East
India Company is a case in point.
When Burke first came into contact with the affairs of
the East India Company he let it be known that he had no
disagreement with the prescriptive right of the company's
charter. However, after he became better acquainted with
the company's conduct he attacked the privileges set down in
the charter, arguing that the company abused the trust given
C ,-7
to it. Since all political power, including "every
species of political domination and every description of
commercial privilege", "ought to be exercised some way or
other for their (i.e., those who are subject to the exercise
of power and privilege) benefit", power is ultimately a
trust "to be rendered accountable ." 58
The "Popery Laws" consisted of various pieces of
legislation designed to undermine the Catholic religion in
Ireland. Although the "Tract on the Popery Laws" never
became a public speech it did circulate among politicians
who influenced policy on Ireland . Burke begins his
argument with a catalogue of the various harms Catholics
suffer because of the laws. Burke is asking his audience to
consider or watch the effects of their prejudicial feeling
against Irish Catholics. Catholics cannot obtain a univer-
sity education nor may they teach. They are prohibited from
political office, from the professions of the law and the
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military. rheir right to own property is interfered with to
the extent that farmers cannot obtain loans because they
have no collateral.
Burke details the destructive effects the laws have on
the Catholic family. "Paternal power is enervated" because
children are given the legal right to determine and obtain
portions of their inheritance. Family relations are
poisoned by allowing the parent who gave up the Catholic
faith the right to deprive the remaining Catholic parent of
his or her parental rights. Here we find Burke detailing
the effects of the English prejudice against Catholicism
noting their destructive impact on family relations. Next
we find Burke justifying why closely attending to the
consequences of English policy toward Catholic Irish,
especially their moral effects, is so critical. His attack
on "moral platitudes" articulates an important principle of
justice.
Mere general truths interfere very little with the
passions. . .until they are roused by a troublesome
appl icat ion ... when they know them only as barren
speculations, and not as practical motives for conduct,
it will be proper to press, as well as offer them to
the understanding; and when one is attacked by pre-
judices which aim to intrude themselves into the place
of law, what is left for us but to vouch and call to
warranty those principles of original justice from
whence alone our title to everything valuable in
society is derived . 60
Burke realizes that nearly everyone recognizes "equity" as
central to justice, but few will see the Popery Laws as
inequitable unless they attempt the task of applying the
principles of justice. Calling to account the principles of
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original justice requires situating them in a context of an
in just ice--relat ing them to present realities--f or otherwise
principles are nothing more than "barren speculations".
Burke proceeds to relate the situation of Irish Catholics to
equity and public utility, showing how our respect for
justice requires the repeal of the Popery Laws.
Neither equity nor public utility are abstract prin-
ciples of right. "Equity grows out of the great rule of
equality, which is grounded upon our common human nature". 6 ^-
Equity demands respect towards others; it does not describe
a precise set of goods that we owe to others. We ought to
listen to grievances and seek mutual understanding.
Because we have a common nature mutual understanding is both
possible and a moral obligation. We also deepen our own
sense of justice and our understanding of our nature by
opening ourselves to their grievances, by "extending"
sympathy to them. Enlarging our sense of morality deepens
our understanding of human nature. Burke concerned himself
quite often with the temper of politics. He seemed acutely
aware of the importance of nurturing conditions favorable to
mutual understanding and sympathy. In a letter on Irish
affairs sent to Sir Langrishe Burke criticized politicians
for "insulting the understandings" and "galling the feel-
ings" of Catholics . 62
For Burke sympathy is the most significant social
virtue. Sympathy is the way "by which we enter into the
6 3
concerns of others" and become moved as they are moved.
69
We see from a review of Adam Smith's Theory of Moral
Sentiments the central importance Burke gave to sympathy.
..the author seeks for the foundation of the just, the
fit, the proper, the decent in our most common and
allowed passions; and making approbation and disap-
probation the tests of virtue and vice and showing that
those are founded on sympathy, he raises from this
simple truth one of the beautiful fabrics of moral
theory
. . .
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As to how we become "sympathetic", Burke adds that "it is
with the use of our imagination that we can form a concep-
tion of what others feel." We do this by entering into
their situation and "by bringing the case home to our-
selves." We enter into the situation of another in an
immediate way when a sad look suddenly affects us. Most of
the time, however, we need to understand the occasion on
order to grasp the emotion . 65 Bringing the case home to us
requires that we understand the situation of the other which
entails more than just a description of the plight of the
other
.
We might want to think of bringing the case home in a
literal way to mean we ought to consider the other as a
family member. During the long and drawn out impeachment
hearings of Warren Hastings, Burke gave his servants Indian
names so he would be constantly reminded of Hasting's crimes
against the Indian people . 66 In addition to detailing the
moral effects of the laws punishing Catholicism, Burke
provokes a "troublesome application" in his readers with
arguments that show how the Popery Laws assault widely
recognized social and political traditions. If "a law which
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shuts out from all secure and valuable property the bulk of
the people", can be made for "the utility of the party so
excluded", how will we ever distinguish tyrannical rule from
e<3u ^^- akle rule? If we maintain that the laws are "reform-
atory" and designed to bring Catholics over to a better
religion, what sense can we make of religious persecution?®®
Burke is appealing to the often acclaimed political prin-
ciples (their political inheritance) of his audience hoping
to strike "home"
.
The argument against the Popery Laws in general depends
on the vitality of certain political principles or maxims
(take the threat of tyranny and religious persecution
seriously) and on a concern for family life. The stress on
the problem of application indicates that justice must be
understood in terms that address the aspects of novelty in
the present. Thus we see the commitment Burke mades to
being faithful to the uniqueness of the concrete and
immediate situation. We can also assume that for Burke to
be effective in dislodging the English from their prejudice,
for his arguments to have even the possibility of hitting
home, his audience must be capable of having sympathy for
Irish Catholics. They must understand the English political
inheritance and feel an obligation to continue it even when
prejudice is in conflict with it. Sympathy is obviously not
the initial reaction of the English to the Catholic ques-
tion, but perhaps it can evoked by addressing the devoted
fathers of his audience (consider the effects the Popery
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laws have on their families), or by drawing attention to the
wisdom of the English political tradition.
Burke did not always take the direct approach employed
in the speech against the Popery Laws"
. As one might
expect of a politician moral aims were often related to the
political exigencies of the moment. During a period of
difficulty for British military Burke recommended that a
division of Catholic soldiers be organized under their own
officers for service in Portugal. Burke cited not only the
needed bolstering of military strength, but also argued that
organizing a Scottish brigand helped quiet discontent among
the Scottish Highlanders .® 9
Burke's position on the slave trade shows the caution
of someone striving to add only benefits to the inheritance.
Gradualism in policy making has the advantage of permitting
a carefully calculation of benefits. But the rationality of
developing policy and achieving justice incrementally is
dependent upon the idea of partnership, specifically the
fact that descendants will pick up where one has left off.
Although Burke voted at least once to abolish slavery,
a measure which failed to pass, his letter to Dundas
contained a proposal to regulate slave trade which included
provisions to provide for the education and medical needs of
slaves and also encouraged family life. In his proposal
he argued that the "donation of freedom must be preceded by
dispensing the minds of the objects to a disposition to
it 71
receive it without danger to themselves or to us". The
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restraint of slavery "cripples the minds of men"
; they can
do nothing for themselves". The conviction that the
"planter you must at once restrain and support; and you must
control, at the same time you ease, the servant" guides
Burke's approach. Fundamental is the statement he makes at
the end of his proposal. He describes his reform as "but a
beginning of a course of measures, which an experience of
the effects of evil and the reform will enable the Legisla-
ture hereafter to supply and correct." Burke does not worry
that there may be only one historic opportunity to end
slavery. His faith in future legislatures and in the
vitality of English political institutions is strong. The
inheritance will be passed down to future generations. The
relationship of generations, the partnership of mankind,
promotes more than a cautious approach to reform. Political
action appears more rational, more compelling to take up,
when the context of politics includes homage to the dead, a
related obligation to future generations, and assurance that
even if I am forgotten my political acts survive in the
context of future political thought and deeds. The concept
of inheritance is thus central to the arguments Burke makes
on behalf of justice. Even the attempt to gain sympathy for
the Irish Catholic by describing their "pitiful" condition,
which might be construed as a reaching out for the heart of
the English in some immediate, personal way, ultimately
hinges on dislodging the English prejudice. To accomplish
that task Burke directs his reader to their political
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inheritance, their "bank" of wisdom. Of course, as a father
one ought to be immediately affected by stories of troubled
Irish families. The protestant has a simple retort: The
Irish need only give up their Catholicism. The troubled
English father may take refuge in the thought that the
Catholics are deserving of their misery or that they must
suffer in order to be rid of Catholicism. We find Burke
even responding to the view that the "preventive persecu-
tion" of a minority enhances public safety, calling it a
policy "rotten, hollow at bottom". Eliciting sympathy and
enlarging moral sensibilities is difficult unless the
argument for justice causes a "troublesome application" to
our unreflective use of tradition.
Inheritance and the "Partnership"
The significance of accepting our inher i tance--of seeing the
past as something to which we are obi igated--f or political
life and for the historical sense of a community is force-
fully illustrated in a passage which echoes through the work
of MacIntyre and Walzer whenever they attempt to articulate
a historical community, a community with the depth of past
t ime .
. . . the state ought not to be considered as nothing
better than a partnership agreement in a trade of
pepper and coffee. . .It is to be looked upon on with
other reverence; because it is not a partnership in
things subservient only to the gross animal existence
of a temporary and perishable nature. It is a partner-
ship in all science; a partnership in all art; a
partnership in every virtue, and in all perfection. As
the ends of such a partnership cannot be obtained in
many generations, it becomes a partnership not only
between those who are living, but between those who are
living and those who are dead, and those who are to be
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born. Each contract of each particular state is but a
clause in the great primaeval contract of eternal
society, linking the lower and higher natures, con-
necting the visible and invisible world, according to a
fixed compact sanctioned by the inviolable oath which
holds all physical and moral natures, each in their
appointed place. 1
3
The state, the laws and the ins t i tut ions—our political
inheritance— is a "partnership". But what makes us "part-
ners"? What experience or experiences lie behind and
motivate a partnership capable of binding past, present, and
future generations? Since the ends of art, science, and
virtue cannot be attained in any one lifetime, we are, as
our fathers and mothers were, dependent on future genera-
tions to continue our work and carry on our life's projects.
It would seem that the very rationality of our actions
depends on the vitality of the partnership and the expecta-
tion that our descendants will understand and choose to
continue our art, science, and virtue. If there is no sense
of being in partnership with generations past and future,
then much of human action becomes senseless. Only a
senseless death can follow a life of senseless acts. The
son or daughter comes face-to-face with the question of how
the deaths in their family can have sense. One answer is to
continue their projects, their work— to somehow take up
where they left off.
...As the ends or such a partnership cannot be obtained
in many generations, it becomes a partnership not only
between those who are living, but between those who are
1 ivin
born
.
?4
and those who are dead, and those who are to be
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We are obligated to the dead and to those yet to be
born. The imperative lodged in the obligation to the dead
is tempered, I think, by the obligation to those unborn.
Consideration of future generations forces us to "attend to
the train of things as they successfully emerge" and not be
blinded or overwhelmed by the obligation to the dead.
The notion of each generation ("each particular state")
connected to the other according to a fixed compact set,
"each in their appointed place", belies any notion of deep
seated conflict. The statement testifies to Burke's strong
belief in the essential unity of the partnership. In
practical terms, the essential unity of the partnership
means that we have the power and the ability to fulfill our
obligations to the dead and to the unborn. The divine
origin of all obligation enforces our duty not with the
threat of retribution in the next life but with the promise
that God has given us the wherewithal necessary to fulfill-
ing our obligations. If we should, we can.
There is nothing that God has judged good for us, that
he has not given us the means to accomplish." "The
divine author of our being has virtually subjected us
to act the part which belongs to the place assigned
us . 75
Clearly, Burke understood the partnership of generations in
religious terms, though whether we must ultimately share his
religious metaphysics remains to be answered. Burke clearly
consecrates human history, calling it the "known march of
providence}." 7<^ It may be the case that the notion of
providence helps to underwrite a tragic sense of life and
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make psychologically easier (by lessening the demand for
coherence) the difficult task of meeting the dual obliga-
tions to past and to future. In other words, if we are
assigned our place providentially, then we are more able to
care for the future of our children and remain good, dutiful
sons and daughters--no easy task . 77
If we compare Burke's partnership to MacIntyre's
concept of the narrative unity of life, we find some
similarities. Both speak of a partnership that runs through
history and unites generations in a common enterprise. For
MacIntyre we ought to speak of separate common enterprises
and the common enterprise of the search for the good life
for man. The desire to pursue a practice and realize the
good internal to the practice links us to the past because
we must, if we are to become violinists, learn from those
who are adept at playing the violin . 78 Virtually any
practice we desire to take up requires our subordination to
the standards governing the practice. We are not required
to mimic past masters; we must only begin under their
tutelage. Today's standard evolves in history by the very
process of taking up yesterday's standard through constant
practice
.
When we turn to the common enterprise, the question of
linkage to the past is much more of an issue—we have
stepped beyond the craft analogy of masters and apprentices.
That we ought to subject ourselves to the authority of the
tradition of seeking answers to the question of what is the
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good for man and to those who speak most authoritatively on
the moral tradition is less apparent than in crafts.
MacIntyre himself shifts his discussion away from crafts and
practice to the concept of narrative, where the search for
intelligibility drives us backwards into history and into
the moral tradition. After Virtue itself is an excellent
example of how MacIntyre conceives of narrative unity. His
initial discussion of the failure of the enlightenment
project led him to write a history of the concept of virtue
that stretches back to Homeric Greece.
The drive into narrative history and thus the concep-
tion of partnership we find in After Virtue is very dif-
ferent from the Burkean notion. The quest for intel-
ligibility is foremost in After Virtue whereas in Burke a
moral obligation to the past predominates. Moreover, this
obligation to the past has the very human texture of family
life pervading it. We can describe the difference in terms
of two different questions. For MacIntyre, we ask our-
selves, how can I make sense of my life--what is the best
life for man generally and for me in particular? Burkeans
ask, how shall we act so as to improve and not diminish our
inheritance, bearing in mind that we stand before the
sepulchers of our departed ancestors?
The intelligibility of human action is less pressing
for Burke because of his religious belief in a divinely
sanctioned order. Burkeans are immediately caught up in the
world of their fathers. They are bound to the past by the
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strength of their love or fear. MacIntyre is looking for
consistency; his quest (his exhuming of the past) is
directed toward settling the issue of what is the right way
to live. MacIntyre is without the assurances of
Providence. Therefore, he must find certainty in his
interpretation of human action in the context of an narra-
tive of history.
Burkeans endure their hardships because their place is
set in God's appointment book. MacIntyre's traditionalist
plumbs the historical depths in order to be certain of the
rationality of his action. The significance of the quest
for intelligibility is clear in a passage concerning the
narrative unity of life . 80 The "central importance of the
concept of intelligibility" lies in its relationship to the
fact that we are accountable for that of which we are the
authors. Since we are the authors of our actions we must be
willing to give an account of them. We must do this by
placing our acts in the context of a history or a narrative
in which short-term intentions are related to long-term
intentions and our intentions themselves are embedded in the
narrative in which we find ourselves. Only actions that can
situated in a narrative are intelligible and thus respon-
sible. What counts as intelligible is ultimately a matter
of social discourse. Each of us holds the other to account
for the intelligibility of his actions. For instance,
MacIntyre turns to a history of the concept of virtue to
make sense of and defend his disagreement with the En-
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lightenment view of the self. In his theoretical discourse
the drive to intelligibility requires addressing everyone
who holds or even held a position on virtue. Indeed,
justification before all of human history is necessary.
Burke's rejection of theory and "rationalism" would
include rejection of MacIntyre's neo-Hegelian intellec-
tualizing. Burke's immediate attachment to traditions (our
emotional attachment to the world of our fathers) would
ideally sustain a practical politics in which we enlarge our
moral sensibilities and conrront emerging reality. But
there are dangers here as well. Devotion to the fathers
might go beyond reverence to a crippling subordination to
the mighty fathers . I do not intend my remarks here to be
read as a vote for Burke's approach versus MacIntyre. I
shall have more to say concerning MacIntyre in the next
chapter
.
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3 0The interpretation I give of the Burke's famous quotation,
'people will not look forward to posterity who never lookbackward to their ancestors", is unusual. A much more commoninterpretation not without its merits can be found in John
MacCunn, The Political Philosophy of Burke. MacCunn faults
Burke for not looking forward to posterity. Burke understood
the significance of the past but with respect to the future
"his faith failed him". He could not "inspire an ideal of
constitutional and social progress". (pp. 268-272) MacCunn
fails to consider the apparent connection Burke draws between
looking backwards and looking forwards.
31Burke, Works (Bohn), vol.6, p.33.
32Paul Lucus argues that Burke's Reflections . .
.
was, in the
words of Novalis, a revolutionary book written against the
revolution. His revolution was to eliminate the question of
just title. With Burke, "the principled sort of conservatism
began to die". See "On Edmund Burke's Doctrine of Prescrip-
tion", Historical Journal XI, #1, (1968), 62.
Correspondence (Cambridge), vol.6, 94.
34Burke adds a qualifier: "The longer they have lasted, and
the more generally they have prevailed, the more we cherish
them". Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in
France
,
ed . Conor Cruise O'Brien, p.183.
35Burke, Works (Rivington edition 1826-1827), vol.5, p.100.
36Quoted in Larry Adams, "Edmund Burke: The Psychology of
Citizenship", Interpretatio n, III #2-3, 198.
1,7 Adams, "Edmund Burke: The Psychology of Citizenship", 198.
2 ®Recall his comments on the necessary imperfection of
political principles and moral/political reality. See
section on the "Burke and the Critique of Rationalism".
•^Correspondence (Cambridge), voi.l, pp. 119-120, p.139.
40Edmund Burke, Works (Bohn), vol.3, p.79.
4
4
Even this simple duality is not all that easy to manage.
42See note three above and note one in chapter one.
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Burke 1 s discussion of the sublime is detailed in The
jU-kl i me
—
the Beautiful
. If our ancestors are "beautiful",
say in addition to or instead of being sublime, then our
relationship is not mediated by terror.
44 Isaac Kramnick in The Rage of Burke
, makes an involved
argument for treating Burke's relationship to his father as
the key to understanding his ambivalent relationship toward
authority and toward the aristocracy. Burke wanted the love
of his abusive and domineering father. See pages 53-54, 56.
4 Correspondence (Cambridge), vol.7, p.592.
46Burke, Works (Boston edition), vol.6, pp. 306-307.
47For a complete account of Burke's stormy relations with his
father see Kramnick and the first volume of Carl Cone, Burke
and the Nature of Politics (Lexington, Kentucky. University
of Kentucky Press, 1957-1964).
48Burke
,
Works ( Bohn )
,
vol
. 2
,
p . 306 . The emphasis is my own
49Burke Works ( Bohn ) vol . 2 pp . 306-307
.
!
’°Burke
,
Works ( Bohn )
,
vol.3, p. 114 .
^
^Burke
,
that we
Works
all to
( Bohn )
eas i ly
vol . 3 ,
have an
p . 1 1 4 . Burke makes the point
unwarranted confidence in our
own reasoning. "When we must go out of the sphere of our
ordinary ideas", "we can never walk sure, but by being
sensible of our blindness". Burke, Works
,
(Bohn), vol.l, p.4.
R O
‘^Imagine a young, guilt-ridden german working the metaphor
of the oak tree. It would obviously become a critique of
german indifference to their past and a metaphor of avoid-
ance. The oak tree is a well known metaphor of Burke's used
to illustrate the English habit of deference to tradition.
r]30n this last point, if our ancestors did not have an "ex-
clusive confidence in their reasoning"
,
it is because they
may well have erred. We need to think of additions to their
stock of wisdom rather broadly to include revision. Burke at
times gave revisionism a prominent role. His complaint that
celebrations of the ancient constitution really celebrated
"monuments of our pristine rudeness" suggests a theory of
progressive development of institutions. See Burke, Works
(Bohn edition) vol.6, pp. 415-416.
^ 4
"0ur moral feelings are the most excellent part of our
nature, but they might mislead our judgment, it was of
consequence to watch their operation." Burke, Works
(Riving ton edition), vol.3, p.523.
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8 6Burke
,
Works (Bohn), vol.3, pp . 81-82.
^Burke
, Reflections on the Revolution in France,
O'Brien, p.149. The quotation is from the Works
edition), vol
. 3, p.177.
ed
. ,
( Rivington
5 7Cone, Burke and the Nature of Politics
, vol . 2
,
p.96.
5 8Burke, Works
.
( Bohn)
, vol. 2, p.178. Burke did not have a
theory of utility. "Benefit" must be understood in terms of
his desire to address specific abuses and evils. In a letter
to Michael Miller, Burke wrote that complaints "ought to be
distinctly stated, and the redress desired made agreeable to
the true nature of the grievance, that is to charge the fault
on the law which belongs to the law, and on men, their own
abuses". See Correspondence edited by Sir Richard Bourke
,
vol. 2, pp. 263-265.
c; Q
Burke, Works (Bohn), vol. 6, pp. 46-48.
60Burke, Works (Bohn), vol. 6, p.24.
61Burke, Works (Bohn), vol. 6, p.22. Burke writes that moral
law is "immutable and pre-existent" and the "eternal home of
the universe". We should not understand Burke as ruling out
changes in our understanding of morality. The interpretation
of original justice in its application does not affect the
original status of justice because we are still maintaining
the relationship to our inheritance.
62Works (Rivington), vol. 9, p.413.
63See Burke, On the Sublime and the Beautiful (Bohn), vol . 1
,
Part One, sections 13, 14, and 15. It is clear from reading
Burke's speeches and writings, especially the Reflections on
the Revolution in France and speeches made during the trial
of Warren Hastings, that Burke held that political rhetoric
was one of the "affecting arts" capable of transposing
passions from "one breast to another" . Doing justice is very
much a matter of speech.
64Annual Register
,
p.485.
f)5Annual Register
,
p.4 85.
® 6See the relevant chapter in volume two of Cone.
‘^Burke, Works (Bohn), vol. 6, pp. 22-24.
^®Burke, Work;:- (Bohn), vol. 6, p.28.
69Thomas Mahoney, Edmund Burke and Ireland (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, I960), p.14.
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^one
' §yid_the Nature of Politics
,
vol . 2 f pp . 386-388.
1
^urke, Works (Rivington), vol. 9, pp. 282-283.
7
2
Burke
,
Works
.
(Bohn), vol. 6, p.32.
7 3Burke, "Reflections on the Revolution in France", Works
( Bohn)
,
vol
. 2
,
p . 368
.
7
4
Burke
,
Works (Bohn), vol. 2, p.368.
7
J
Burke
,
Works
,
(Rivington edition), vol. 3, p.343. See
Works
,
(Bohn), vol. 3, p.79.
76MacCunn, The Political Philosophy of Edmund Burke
,
p.99.
^ 7What makes meeting the dual obligations so difficult is the
fact (Burke believes this to be true) that the present
differs from the past. What was wisdom yesterday cannot be
simply translated into the wise policy of today. History
teaches but cannot direct us to the right choice. Our
attention to the present occurs in a context in which we are
pulled by the past, by a desire to remain respectful of our
fathers and mothers--and their hopes and dreams.
7 RWe refer to the good internal to the practice in the
phrase, "virtue is its own reward". External goods include
prestige, wealth and power which may be given to those who
are virtuous. See MacIntyre, After Virtue
,
181.
7 QWe must keep in mind MacIntyre’s "sophoclean self." A
strong emphasis on the possibilities of a Sophoclean view of
tragedy ( MacIntyre 1 s appropriation of it) tempers the drive
for consistency. It is hard to tell how seriously MacIntyre
takes his discussion of Sophocles. In his most recent book,
Whose Justice? Which Rationality? one finds no mention of
tragedy or of the idea that the quest for the good life is a
quest for living conflict well.
a0MacIntyre, After Virtue
, pp. 195-197.
7
^When Burke says, "People will never look forward to poster-
ity who never look backward to their ancestors" , he is for
the most part referring not to a need for inquiry into the
past but rather is making a statement about how we ought to
feel toward our ancestors. These feelings of filial or
familial devotion implicate us in a past which is the past of
our ancestors—no mere history here— but rather a world
continuous with our own. Burke Works , Boston edition, vol.
3, p. 274-275. Or see "Reflections on the Revolution in
France", Works (Bohn), vol. 2, pp. 306-307.
CHAPTER 3
THE TURN TO TRADITIONS IN CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL THEORY
MacIntyre and the Turn to Tradi ti ons
I shall begin my examination of Alasdair MacIntyre's
After .Vi rtue by taking a look at some prevalent criticisms.^
To what extent can MacIntyre meet the criticisms leveled
against his "communitarian challenge"? 2 More to my point,
can he meet the requirements of his project of reviving
traditions without sliding into a form of traditionalism
which denies the need to reflect upon, debate, and even
reinterpret the meaning of traditions? My focal point
emphasizes the way in which traditions are grounded. What
ties the individual to traditions? What can the character
of that relationship tell us about the possibilities of a
critical appropriation of tradition?
MacIntyre is well known as a critic of liberalism who
refuses to be classed as a political conservative. The
reception to MacIntyre has been conditioned by the fact that
an emphasis on traditions as a source of moral and political
theory and action, when conceptualized in connection with
criticisms of liberal political culture can easily be read
as validating a "self" that knows itself only as a manifes-
tation of society, who can neither act nor think indepen-
dently of the beliefs that society inculcates. In contrast
with liberalism's rhetoric of liberty and free sel f-develop-
ment
,
talk of traditions seems not only anachronistic but
repressive and puritanical. While discussing some recent
criticisms of MacIntyre's work, and offering a defense of
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it, I will develop a criticism of how he grounds traditions.
In After Virtue
, Alasdair MacIntyre argues that
Nietzsche was correct in his diagnosis of Western culture as
nihilistic. Our highest values have devalued themselves; in
fact, we are incapable of justifying our choices on moral
grounds(this is the "disquieting suggestion" mentioned at
the outset) because "the substance of morality has been
fragmented and in part destroyed ." 4 MacIntyre spends a
great deal of time and effort showing how various attempts
of the "Enlightenment Project" for justifying choices fail,
but rather than follow Nietzsche he embraces Aristotle, or
better Ar istotel ianism
,
and specifically; the idea of a
teleology centered on the notion that life is centrally a
quest for living and understanding the good life for man.
This quest, in MacIntyre's view, is grounded in the prac-
tices and the traditions we inherit.
On David Johnston's reading, MacIntyre departs from the
liberal concern with expanding life choices, a view which
holds that human beings flourish in a context whereby new
options and choices are possible, for an (traditionalist)
emphasis on the significance and solidarity the performance
of one's role imparts. The sense of having a place, a
station, secures one's identity and personal worth by
making plain and unambiguous who one is and the value of the
role one performs. Johnston argues that according to tradi-
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t ionalism
, "human flourishing may be dependent upon the
provision of a certain degree of personal freedom and
choice", but human flourishing "consists also in the feeling
of being an active, important contributor to the well-being
of one's group." This feeling can only be cultivated "with-
in a bounded environment that restricts freedom and
choice ." 5 Having "roots" and group obligations necessarily
limits freedom and choice, and hence the experiments in
living that one can entertain.
Johnston's major charge against traditionalism is that
its logical culmination is the questionable goal of elimina-
ting the tension between self and society, or self and
social structure. Quoting Max Weber, Johnston suggests that
though tension causes discomfort it gives us the ability to
"lead an alert, intelligent life ." 6 To this criticism we
may add that the activity of striving to attain an ideal
only makes sense when there is tension between actual social
structures and social ideals important to the identities of
individual selves. However, I doubt whether MacIntyre is
vulnerable to the charge that he would deprive us of tension
in our lives. MacIntyre does not, as Johnston acknow-
ledges, state that the standards of conduct implied in
social roles cannot be modified and altered. The question
is rather how important are natural, unconscious, unreflec-
ted boundaries for MacIntyre? He does in fact describe
pre —modern societies as containing individuals who inherit
a particular space within an interlocking set of social
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relationships; lacking that space, they are nobody, or at
best a stranger or an outcast ." 7 In contrast, MacIntyre
goes on to say, the modern voluntarist view of choosing
roles instead of inheriting them causes the self to lose
"its traditional boundaries provided by a social identity
and a view of human life as ordered to a given end."® in
the traditional view, the boundaries are highly inelastic.
His criticism of voluntarism may suggest his dependence upon
the pre-modern view, but I think to draw such an inference
would be a mistake. As we shall see, MacIntyre is not
intent on denying us the possibility of choosing new roles
and modifying old ones. Rather, he argues that one ought
not cavalierly reject an inherited role. Nor in the
hypothetical choice of new roles can one wholly escape the
influence of what is inherited.
A traditionalist reading of MacIntyre appears well
founded because MacIntyre states that we cannot step outside
of our own social identities without losing the sense that
human life has a telos. Non-arbi trary choice must therefore
be a choice made from within particular social identities,
or rather from an identity already in place about which we
do not deliberate or question. If I doubt whether I am a
citizen of the United States, I lose any deep personal
connection with American traditions. America is no longer a
reference point. Of course, in an obvious and uninteresting
sense we are unlikely to doubt that we are Amei icans We
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shall want to consider whether MacIntyre can explain how we
are in a strong sense part of the American tradition.
We may, of course, question what it means to act out
our roles. MacIntyre expects this. Our choices and delibe-
ration will take place within a context set by the roles we
have inherited. We discover our goals in our social roles,
in our social identity. Human life can have a "given end"
only if we do not choose our social identity. To what
extent this perspective restricts or liberates us cannot be
settled until we know the basis tor the link to traditions
and whether that link with the past supports a critical
traditionalism or not. MacIntyre's talk of inherited roles
and personal identities suggests a la Burke that personal,
family relationships may have importance. Below is
MacIntyre's strongest statement about the power of our
inherited identities in determining the content, or the
boundaries of the self :9
. . I am never able to seek for the good or exercise the
virtues only qua individual ... it is not just that
different individuals live in different social cir-
cumstances; it is also that we all approach our own
circumstances as bearers of a particular social iden-
tity. I am someone's son or daughter, 3ome one else 1 s
cousin or uncle; I am a citizen of this or that city, a
member of this or that guild or profession, I belong to
this clan, that tribe, this nation. Hence what is good
for me has to be the good for one who inhabits these
roles. As such, I inherit from the past of my family,
my city, my tribe, my nation, a variety of duties, in-
heritances, rightful expectations and obligations.
These constitute the given of my life, my moral start-
ing point. This is in part what gives my life its own
moral particularity.
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The language here appeals to common sense in the name
of a rather uncommon perspective. Of course, we are our
father and mother's son, a citizen of a state, and a member
of a profession at least according to census data. But in
what sense do these biographical facts constitute my "moral
starting point"? To the contrary, it is obvious that most
of us are not automatically and unquestionably involved in
this inheritance of rightful expectations and obligations.
If we were, there would be presumably no audience for the
abstractions and flight from particularity of modern liberal
political theory--and MacIntyre would not be engaged in an
argument. No one would speak of a flight from history or
of a paucity of remembrance. So we may ask and must ask,
how is my inheritance invoked or conveyed to me? How is it
that I carry with me— "bear"— a particular social identity?
MacIntyre does not appear to have a Burkean conception.
However, MacIntyre's reliance on a core Burkean concept
raises the issue of what distance MacIntyre can place before
his view of tradition and that of Burke's. On the face of
it, MacIntyre seems to allow for a more critical approach.
In defense of MacIntyre, the term "boundary" as in "boun-
daries to the self" is perhaps too restrictive, too sugges-
tive of limits the self cannot see beyond. For it can be
argued that inherited roles and identities merely give a
direction to our deliberation, a "moral starting point" and
nothing more. A starting point is after all not an end-
point. Nor does the notion of a starting point suit the
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image of a boundary one may never cross and within which one
must remain within and not reason beyond. Nevertheless,
assuming the moral questions and dilemmas of the past, which
Maclnytre claims to be part of our inheritance, is a respon-
sibility that is no mere starting point.
With respect to Johnston's criticism, MacIntyre is not
forcing us to choose between the satisfactions of acting for
the group or acting for oneself. Actions that may con-
tribute to the group range from acts subservient to the
group's expressed goals to acts of disobedience designed to
awaken the group to what the group's traditions really
require. Fulfilling a role does not entail blind loyalty to
the expectations of the group. Indeed, it calls for an in-
dividualism of a special sort—a loyalty to the standards of
conduct implicit in traditions, a willingness to understand
these standards
,
and the courage not to conform to the
interpretation dominant within the group. Therefore, the
restriction involved in acting from a social identification
is not one which requires the abrogation of our ability to
think and judge at least in terms of pressures exerting by
dominant social groups . 10 Of course, we are not delibe-
rating from an archimedean point outside of traditions. We
are acting from an obligation to perform our roles well and
to carry on the traditions that have been handed down to us.
MacIntyre states that when I "subject my own attitudes,
choices ,... to the standards that currently define the prac-
tice"
,
and confront and learn from the entire history of the
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practice up to the present, I am not prostrating myself to
Tradition ." 11 I am engaged in a debate about the goods
the practices and traditions were meant to realize. My
acceptance (but why do I accept this?) of my moral starting
point in the roles that have been handed down to me requires
my engagement in a discourse with the past, with my prede-
cessors, over questions of identity such as—what does it
mean today to be a citizen of this nation? MacIntyre urges
us not to blindly follow the footsteps of our parents but to
take up the challenges they have left for us. The dif-
ference between Burkean conservatism and his own view, ac-
cording to MacIntyre, lies in the significance of argument
and debate for a living tradition. "When a tradition is in
good order it is always partially constituted by an argument
about the goods the pursuit of which gives to that tradition
its particular point and purpose."
The point on which MacIntyre most clearly departs from
Johnston's concept of traditionalism is on whether his
traditionalism offers us psychic security and feelings of
repose. Quite to the contrary, MacIntyre seems to demand
that we accept and live unrelieved conflict among goods.
Our situation is filled with tragic oppositions like that
between Creon and Antigone each of whom for their Greek
audience embodied a commendable principle . 1 "1 MacIntyre
adamantly rejects what he believes to be the view of
Aristotle. Tragedy is not simply caused by character flaws
that could be eliminated . 14
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MacIntyre sums up his position with the statement that
the radical choice between a belief "in the existence of
incompatible goods or belief in some determinate conception
of the good life for man" is mistaken. It is blind to the
possibility that there may be better or worse ways for
individuals to live through the tragic confrontations of
good with good ." 16 Confrontations betweem rival traditions
and conflicting roles will force us to leave "undone what I
ought to have done" because "choosing the one [role/tradi-
tion] does not diminish the claims of the other ." 16
MacIntyre's turn to traditions and our inherited roles is
not likely to promote the kind of psychic security achieved
when fulfilling one's roles fits one into an interlocking
set of harmonious relationships. In Sophoclean tragedy,
although we are saved from the anxiety of the thought that
our choices are completely arbitrary, we must endure the
fact that we face a situation in which more than one good
choice is demanded of us. A "self" capable of meeting
these demands is a "sophoclean self ." 17 As we shall see,
the tenability of the sophoclean self is very important to
MacIntyre's project. Without it, his traditionalism is
likely to become less critical and less likely to face up to
the debates generated by the turn to traditions.
Amy Gutmann questions MacIntyre's assertion "what is
good for me has to be the good for one who inhabits these
roles" [roles similar to my own]. She argues that the
"Aristotelian method of discovering the good by inquiring
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into the meaning of roles is little help in a society in
which most roles are not attached to a single good ." 18 If
most roles do not have single goods attached to them in the
way the role of nurse is attached to caring for the sick or
searching for wisdom is attached to the role of political
philosopher, then to turn questions of choice (what ends
should I choose?) into questions of identity (Who am I, what
do my roles require of me?) will be futile, for no clear
answer is possible. Gutmann asks, "what if Geraldine
Ferraro who had been born into a working-class Italian,
Catholic family had asked 'Who am I?' instead of 'What ends
should I choose ? 1 " 19 Gutmann implies that the answer to
"who am I" would in the case of Ferraro lead her to pursue
the life of a housewife instead of choosing a career in
politics. That is what working class, Italian-Catholic
women traditionally do. Or, it would prove to be of no help
to Ferraro. If action embedded in traditional roles requires
doing exactly what had been done in the past, Gutmann 1 s
example would be extremely damaging to MacIntyre's project.
However, we have seen that for MacIntyre inquiry into the
meaning of a role, of an identity, requires us to confront
and engage in discussion those standards our predecessors
attempted to live. The obligations we incur by inheriting a
role do not demand blind obedience to the past, nor imita-
tion of the past. They require that we justify our depar-
ture from the prevailing understandings of what the role
entails in terms of the goods the traditions and roles were
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meant to realize. Ferraro could argue, without rejecting
ner identities of being an Italian mother and a Catholic,
that her political identity as a citizen requires her par-
ticipation in politics, and that previous Italian, Catholic
women neglected to understand the importance of the politi-
cal arena for concerns important to women or that political
opportunities were previously unavailable to women.
“Citizen" is a traditional role albeit not a role assumed by
women until this century. It is a role with a rich history
and an equally rich set of problems that is the inheritance
of every adult American. When Ferraro asks "Who am I?" she
must turn to at least two roles with at least two correspon-
ding streams of traditions. Her identity as a citizen turns
her toward the traditions of American politics, including
the debate generated within those traditions. The questions
provoked in her confrontation with our political past in-
clude: What does it mean to be a citizen? What do we owe
others? What is the purpose of politics? Her involvement
in the answers Americans have given to these questions and
the debates those answers have engendered would give her a
deeper understanding of the choices confronting her. Her
identity as an Italian-Catholic woman turns her towards the
traditions of the Catholic Church and the I talian-American
community. The questions raised may include: What are the
justifications for the role women play within the Catholic
Church?
97
The task of justification in this case may compiicate
the issue. One may object that Ferraro has been forced to
be "reactive" (rather than visionary) by being placed on the
defensive. I believe that if Ferraro took seriously her
background, her inherited identities, far from being put on
the defensive and undermined in her search for a new sense
of being a woman, her search would be greatly facilitated.
Understanding previous attempts to live up to the roles,
including the debate over the meaning of the roles and the
goods the roles (the practices of the role) were meant to
realize, would enable Ferraro to give reasons for her
choice. Her sense of the available possibilities would be
heightened as would her ability to refashion the role to
meet her particular situation. She would be better able to
articulate her own dissatisfactions with the prevailing
interpretations of her roles and thus be more able to
reinterpret her roles.
At the same time reinterpreting a role may lead to
conflict with those who continue to insist upon the correct-
ness and wisdom of the old ways. Ms. Ferraro may find
herself in a conflict with her parents and grandparents--and
that, as I have been arguing, is highly significant for
critical traditionalism. If the attachment to traditions is
mediated through the family as in Burke, then overbearing
ancestors may cause Ferraro to pull away from the debate
over traditional roles.
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The second issue of significance touched on by Gutmann
is the matter of whether MacIntyre's project fails if single
goods are not attached to roles. MacIntyre is quite willing
to concede that conflicts among goods are inevitable. The
measure of a successful life is how well we handle conflicts
among competing goods. So it appears that Gutmann is off
the mark. On the other hand, MacIntyre may have to limit
the degree to which there are multiple, competing goods.
Too much conflict among too many goods might make choice
seem arbitrary. Yet if we take seriously his contention
that the chief moral problem is not finding the truth which
reconciles all goods and eliminates all conflicts but rather
meeting the challenge of living unrelieved conflicts among
goods in a better rather than worse way, then the "deter-
minate conception of the good life for man" is really a set
of virtues that enable us to live well our life of fundamen-
tal conflicts. These virtues, as we shall see, include
character traits that permit us to participate in social
lif e-- truthfulness
,
a willingness to learn from others and
to let traditions challenge us, and so on.
For MacIntyre the danger that arbitrariness poses to
morality is not solved via a theory that reconciles dif-
ferences in some sort of higher universality, or determinate
order for man. The nihilistic view that my choice makes no
difference when choosing among goods that cannot be placed
in an order of preference is countered by MacIntyre with a
theory that stresses the importance and centrality of our
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involvement in goods. To take the conflict in Sophocles'
^I1
-
* igone as an example, a deepening of our attachment to the
perspectives of both Antigone and Creon would put us in the
position of not being able to reject either perspect ive--
they both would become ours
. In place of arbitrary choice,
MacIntyre would have us choose from within an enlarged and
tension filled perspective. Choice would never be simple
but it would always be made within an ethically constituted
world, a morally perceived world. One of MacIntyre's major
tasks, if not the major task, is to show our relationship to
moral reality and how we are grounded in it. Such an argu-
ment would make the "Sophoclean self" and the notion of
tragedy it suggests, a more likely possibility for us.
The notion of life as an enacted narrative brings into
his theory the conception that a coherent life has a narra-
tive order. Given the willingness to embrace conflicting
goods as inevitable, we may ask, what constraints does the
idea of narrative order invoke?
Narration emphasizes the significance of conversation
and dialogue as the basis for living the good life. It is
another attempt on MacIntyre's part to make seeking the good
a public matter and thus put distance between his Aris-
totelianism and the liberal image of the essentially private
pursuit of life, liberty, and happiness. We are only the
co-authors of our own narratives and in turn we are the co
authors of the narratives of countless others. Who we are
is determined in our collective story-telling. The most
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significant way in which narration may work to limit or
resolve conflicts of goods is in how narratives have a
certain teleological character in addition to their un-
predictability.
This unpredictability coexists with a second crucial
characteristic of all lived narratives, a certain
teleological character. We live out our lives, both
individually and in our relationships with each other,
in the light of certain conceptions of a possible
future, a future in which certain possibilities beckon
us forward and others repel us, some seem already
foreclosed and others perhaps inevitable. There is no
present which is not informed by some image of some
future and an image of the future which always presents
itself in the form of a telos—or a variety of ends or
goals-- towards which we are either moving or failing to
move in the present. Unpredictability and teleology
therefore coexist as part of our lives; like characters
in a fictional narrative we do not know what will
happen next, but none the less our lives have a certain
form which projects itself towards our future . 20
It would seem possible that the conflicts among some
goods at least could be made less inevitable and that the
future we seek is one which lessens their intensity. Or,
and perhaps closer to MacIntyre's understanding, in the
future we live out the tension more adequately— in other
words, with less desire to transcend the tension— than we do
at present. MacIntyre adds that our narrative is structured
by a quest for a "conception of the good which will enable
us to order other goods". At the same time, the good life
for us is realized along the way, that is, not in the final
attaining of the good, but in how we conduct ourselves in
the search. We never find the good which orders and
resolves the conflicts among goods.
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The idea of a collectively determined narrative order
to life carries with it the weight, or the structuring power
of history. Because our lives are "always embedded in the
story of those communities" from which we derive our iden-
we are always implicated in a morally charged
world . 22 History grounds us in moral reality. As individu-
als bearing particular social identities we participate in a
collective narrative, in "our" history.
In summary, MacIntyre does not offer us an easy way of
making moral choices. His traditionalism will not enable
someone to rid himself of the tension that results from
conflicts among goods and moral ambiguity. MacIntyre is
attempting to deepen our "historicity", our relationship to
history and the inherited roles and obligations shaped
within it, and thus defeat the threat of "arbitrariness"
without promising the end of moral conflict. The goal is the
affirmation of conflict by way of an awareness of the moral
demands of our inheritance. Getting us to assume our in-
heritance and see the past as our past is therefore the
central task of MacIntyre's critical traditionalism. His
turn to traditions quite obviously depends on making per-
suasive our "standing in" traditions. Collective story-
telling presupposes a sense of belonging to a collective and
especially to the history/narrative of that collective.
...From the standpoint of individualism I am what I
choose myself to be. I can always, if I wish to, put
in question what are taken to be merely contingent
social features of my existence. I may biologically be
my father's son; but I cannot be held responsible for
what he did unless I choose implicitly or explicitly to
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assume such respons ibi 1 i ty . . . the Englishman who says,"!
never did any wrong to Ireland; why bring up that old
history as though it had something to do with me?" or
the young German who believes that being born after
1945 means that what the Nazis did to Jews has no moral
relevance to his relationship to his Jewish contem-
poraries, exhibit the same attitude, that according to
which the self is detachable from its social and his-
torical roles and s tatuses
. . . The contrast with the
narrative view of the self is clear. For the story of
my life is always embedded in the story of those com-
munities from which I derive my identity. I am born
with a past; and to try to cut myself off from that
past, in the individualist mode, is to deform my pre-
sent relationships.^
Why should we see ourselves as embedded in a narrative that
we must take up? It is certainly possible that we may
choose to reject identities. Although the rejection of a
role implicates us in the past, a negative relation is
hardly one which confronts tradition. One is hardly open to
the claims of traditions. More troubling to the the notion
that we must turn to traditions is the possibility that I
can be unaware, even uninterested in my social identity. Or
I may reject my social identities. Modern culture may
neglect traditions as a matter of principle. MacIntyre's
response has the character of the bold assertion, you are
i 24your roles
.
Certainly, his arguments against the "Enlightenment
Project" are meant to provide support for his contention
that a turn to traditions is our only possibility for an
ethical life.^^ Edmund Burke would agree with his statement
that our inheritance carries with it obligations and right-
ful expectations. The argument against the enlightenment
project and the various attempts to develop a liberal (.on-
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cept of self hardly establishes the necessity of affirming
inherited social identities. It is difficult to imagine
how, say, the fear of nihilism could open up the past in a
positive way. On the other hand, one can easily imagine how
desperate clinging to the ways of the past in the manner of
a conservative traditionalist results from the threat of
nihilism and the madness it suggests.
Like Burke, MacIntyre insists we cannot understand the
present unless we understand the past . Yet no one would
disagree with this statement as it reads because merely
affirming a causal relation between past and present carries
it with no automatic sense of moral responsibility. The
German born after 1945 may indeed see the connection between
the creation of the Bundesrepubl ik and the Second World War,
but he need not consider himself responsible for the results
of the war. I see no warrant for asserting some sort of
necessity here.
On a similar note, MacIntyre complains that we are
without a real patriotism, we have no "patria" that requires
defense because the state does not represent the moral
community. 26 "Patria" is obviously a term with a strong
emotional resonance, linked as it is with the world of the
fathers; but MacIntyre does not notice the connection and
seems uninterested in exploring what may enliven our presum-
ably undeveloped sense that we do indeed have a patria worth
27defending
.
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MacIntyre does recognize that a turn to traditions
requires the "virtue of having an adequate sense of the
traditions to which one belongs or which confront one." He
is quick to add that he is not recommending a conservative
ant iquar ianism
.
2 8 However, he is not clear on how we cul-
tivate what is surely the single most important virtue for
his project. If having an adequate sense of the traditions
is a "kind of capacity for judgment", what develops that
capacity? Moreover, if that capacity is not simply
knowledge of the past and of the traditions, what can it be?
What else does it include?
The turn to traditions must distinguish trivial and
self-serving appeals to the past from a relation to the past
which puts the meaning of the identity of the self at risk.
Traditions cannot become rationalizations tacked on to
positions unquestionably assumed to be true, without losing
their positive relationship to the act of judgment. The
emphasis MacIntyre puts on the relationship of our identity
to our inherited roles prevents the self from "using" his-
tory. Instead, MacIntyre has it that the self truly under-
stands itself within the obligations and roles shaped in
history--at least initially . 30 The historicized self is
open to the possibility of learning something about what it
means to be an American, a teacher, a family member, a
resident of Amherst, or a first-generation American of
German parents from history. By contrast, if we look to the
past in order to add the weight of the past to positions on
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issues with which we unquestionably identify we are not open
to the past nor can we say that we are "standing" in the
past. History does not exist; we are simply using the past.
Drawing lessons from the past in this way merely surveys
traditions as a source of support, just one of many possible
tools for d isputat ion
.
3
^ Since we are not learning any-
thing, we are most certainly not sharpening our capacity for
judgment. Our relationship to traditions must include a
ground for respecting traditions. The challenge facing the
turn to traditions is to ground respect in a manner com-
patible with the criticism and revision of traditions.
Embedded in After Virtue is an explanation of how we
become educated into traditions of social practices . 32 if
we look to MacIntyre's understanding of this process of
education we may find an explanation of our connection to
traditions. Moreover, we can see what giving traditions
respect involves . 33
To enter into a practice is to accept the authority of
those standards and the inadequacy of my own perfor-
mance as judged by them. It is to subject my own
attitudes, choices, preferences and tastes to the
standards which currently and partially define the
practice. . .the standards themselves are not immune from
criticism, but none the less we cannot be initiated
into a practice without accepting the authority of the
best standards realized so far. If, on starting to
listen to music, I do not accept my own incapacity to
judge correctly, I will never learn to hear, let alone
appreciate, Bartok's last quar tets . . . In the realm of
practices the authority of both goods and standards
operates in such a way as to rule out all subjectivist
and emotivist analyses of judgment.
Unless I grant the tradition of social practices authority I
will never be able to participate in social practices. A
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certain attitude of mind is a prerequisite for action gov-
erned by standards. The desire to act correctly and par-
ticipate in a social practice with proficiency motivates a
willingness to subordinate oneself to the tradition of the
social practice. According to MacIntyre, all artists begin
by submitting to the traditions relevant to their activity.
They may appear to make a break with tradition, but that
break is really a creative extension of the tradition. The
"starting point" for the would-be artist or social actor are
the traditions.
The chief weakness of this approach, taking the would-
be artist as an example, lies in the fact that the novice
artist's willing subordination to his craft already assumes
an identification with the role/ ident i ty of the artist. The
novice already knows, or believes he knows, that he is an
art is t- to-be . The "starting point" in the artist's tradi-
tion is already in place before any decision is made con-
cerning what a novice must do in order to become a profi-
cient artist. The rationale for the subordination of
oneself to the tradition fails to explain how one becomes
ini t ial ly situated in the tradition. So, we cannot spin an
explanation of our location in tradition from MacIntyre's
"craft analogy".
Is it simply a question of what motivates one to turn
to the traditions that one is? What argument—what speech
—
can highlight who we are? Burke taps "natural feeling , the
sentiments located and nurtured in the "small platoon" to
107
which we belong. These feelings of love undergird a respect
for the traditions that structure and provide the setting
for our local attachments. Familial love extends to include
the world that has been handed down to us from our ances-
tors. Burke's turn seems on the face of it more compelling.
MacIntyre mostly argues in a negative way, hoping that
criticism of the Enlightenment and the posing of Nietzsche
as the dreadful alternative (that we ought not dare embrace)
makes Aristotelian traditionalism seem our only real pos-
sibility tor an ethics. However, is not the approach taken
by MacIntyre too intellectual and despite the scare tactic,
too detached from our emotional life? Perhaps there is
something to Burke's view that the consideration of the
needs of persons beyond our small circle of intimates must
build on the emotional attachments nurtured in the family
and community . 34
We find additional evidence for the significance of the
problem of location in, or attitude toward, traditions in
the prominent place given to friendship by MacIntyre.
Friendship "embodies a shared recognition of and pursuit of
a good." 3 ^ It is therefore essential to the exercise of all
O
traditions and social practices.
...the recognition of authority and of achievement,
respect for standards and the kind of risk-taking
characteristically involved in practices,
demand. . .fairness in judging oneself and others. . .wil-
lingness to trust the judgments of those whose achieve-
ment in the practice give them an authority to judge
which presupposes fairness and truthfulness in those
judgments . . .
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MacIntyre approvingly quotes Aristotle's argument that
lawgivers rank friendship higher than justice because "jus-
tice is the virtue of rewarding desert and repairing fail-
ures in rewarding desert within an already constituted
community; friendship is required for that initial constitu-
O O
tion"
. Friendship is not just a virtue. It is as well a
social form inextricably related to the exercise of virtues
including the virtues of truthfulness, fairness, and "having
an adequate sense of the traditions" . Without these virtues
there can be no turn to traditions. On this point I have
argued that the German philosopher Hans-Georg Gadamer lends
considerable support. Gadamer shows that only when we
relate to traditions and the conversation in and about
traditions as if we were in a relation of "I-thou" is the
otherness of tradition affirmed . 39
In the terms of our discussion of whether or not
MacIntyre persuades us that we really do stand in traditions
the significance of the classical Aristotelian ideal of
friendship poses a problem. First, there is the obvious
absence of notions of classical Greek friendship in modern
politics. MacIntyre admits that friendship has become a
private relationship and therefore not very Greek at all.
If it is also the case that in our private (or privatized)
friendships the recognition and pursuit of a shared politi
cal good makes little sense then it would seem that the turn
to tradition is bound to fail because the community neces-
sary for a politics of the good (the goods of traditions and
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social practices) is unavailable. Unless the mutuality
found in friendship has a source somewhere in society, the
attempt to revive traditions as embodiments of debates and
arguments over the point of practices, will produce few
shared conceptions and very little community. The past will
be mined for the weight it can heap on essentially private
and self-serving positions arrived at independently of any
understanding of our history. Debates over the meaning of
traditions will be lost in the antiquarian quest for line-
age. Having an adequate understanding of the traditions is
crucial for the success of the turn to traditions and the
desirability of a politics of goods.
Walzer: Self-Respect, Traditions, and Justice
Similarly, for Michael Walzer understanding traditions
correctly is central to the achievement of justice. Michael
Walzer puts self-respect at the center of Spheres of Jus-
tice ; and the self-respect of individuals is dependent upon
everyone respecting the traditional standard that govern the
various spheres of social life. We shall see whether Walzer
fares better than MacIntyre in explaining our relationship
to traditions.
Walzer argues that whereas self-esteem tends to rest
almost entirely on the opinions of others who in turn com-
pete with us for recognition in a zero-sum game (being fore-
most cannot be shared) , the basis for self-respect and
respect for others rests on membership in a cooperative
activity and living up to the standards defining that ac-
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tivlty. For example, respect among doctors Is predicated
upon their shared commitment to medicine-- let ' s say, their
commitment to the Hippocratic oath. Of course, some doctors
become more distinguished than others. The standards defin-
ing the activity of medicine are standards that all doctors
meet to some degree. Distributive justice has its ultimate
justification in making self-respect possible . 40 When
distributive justice does its work of policing the boun-
daries which distinguish the various spheres of social
goods, social life takes place according to the shared
understandings underlying each particular sphere. Justice
occurs when social goods of one sphere are not used to
dominate the social meanings of another sphere. For ex-
ample, wealth will not buy love, or a doctorate in philo-
sophy, or a medical degree, or political influence. Simi-
larly, in the sphere of politics citizens respect other
citizens on the basis of the standards defining the activity
of citizenship. Citizens are allowed "social space" so that
they may act out their role of being a citizen . 41 When
self-respect and respect for others depend on a willingness
to adhere to standards that underlie the activity of citi-
zenship, social position is unimportant. In an important
sense the traditions which characterize this activity must
rule .
Self-respect must compete with the tendency for wealth
or power (citing just two possibilities) to cross boundaries
and undermine the operation of shared understandings and
Ill
frustrate the achievement of self-respect. Where wealth
makes my participation in politics irrelevant, that is, when
the only voices heard are those who command a respect foun-
ded on their accumulation of wealth, not only is my self-
respect attacked but the ground of respect and equality for
all members of the polity is similarly undermined. It is
easy to see how respect for others and the dignity made
possible by that respect undergirds relationships of mutual-
ity. Central are the shared understandings and standards
that make social life and mutual respect possible. The
ground of mutuality lies in a shared life or shared ac-
tivity. It is for this reason that Walzer comes up with an
interpretation of the autonomous individual in precisely
these terms of sharing.
His argument goes this way: Self-respect demands
"self-possession", that we own and own up to our "character,
qualities, and actions". Given the relationship of our
identity to the task of living up to a set of social mean-
ings (shared standards), it is this self-possession which
makes our personal acts psychological possible. Can I
handle the pressure of medical emergencies? Ef not, I could
never practice medicine. Am I willing to risk an opinion in
politics? Unless I am able to do so I will never be an
active citizen. If I am unable to say I love You? ,
intimacy with another is not possible. MacIntyre would
readily agree that participation in social practices
requires the conception of a self -responsible person as an
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autonomous person—autonomous however, as Walzer puts it,
in his community" as a "free and responsible agent," as a
"participating member ." 42
Much like MacIntyre, Walzer insists that we indeed are
situated in a particular social and historical place--in the
cave of Plato's Republic not out beyond it where philoso-
phers are known to lurk. We must stay inside the cave
because whatever we fashion outside of the cave "can never
be fashioned for ordinary men and women" . The moral philo-
sopher must understand that "the problem justice poses is
precisely to distribute goods to a host of Xs in ways that
are responsive to their concrete, integrated selves."
However, the "terrain of everyday life" which Walzer bids us
to keep to is not simply everyday life. There are superfi-
cial understandings of our shared meanings and there are
understandings that are the results of reflective thought
engaged in revealing what may be hidden in our concepts and
categories. 4 '^ His arguments about concrete identities
demand that we see our identities in an open and flexible
way within a discourse about the social meanings that struc-
ture the spheres of existence. Everyday life as normally
lived does not bear witness to a fluid concept of identity
and self, nor is discourse over social meaning a common
occurrence. Like MacIntyre, Walzer faces the difficulty of
situating the self in a relation to tradition that is not
traditionalist
.
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Walzer understands the self In a way that stresses both
a passive and active relation to social meanings and tradi-
tions. Walzer avoids the traditionalist reduction of the
self to its inherited roles by imagining human action as
necessarily involving an awareness of history and an active
and creative appropriation of that history. 44
. . .goods with their meanings--because of their mean-
ings are the crucial medium of social relat ions ... one
might almost say that goods distribute themselves among
people. "Things are in the saddle/And ride
mankind ."... of course, we make the things--even the
saddle. I don't want to deny the importance of human
agency, only to shift our attention from distribution
itself to conception and creation: the naming of
goods, and the giving of meaning, and the collective
making
. .
.
...Men and woman take on concrete identities because of
the way they conceive and create and then possess and
employ social goods ... in fact, people already stand in
a relation to a set of goods; they have a history of
transactions, not only with each other, but also with
the moral and material world in which they live.
Without such a history, which begins at birth, they
wouldn't be men or women in any recognizable sense...
... it is the meaning of goods that determines their
movement ... al 1 distributions are just or unjust rela-
tive to the social meanings of the goods at stake...
Two points are interesting to note. The conceiving of the
meaning of a good is also a creative act. Appropriation of
the past contains a moment of application to the present.
Also, we "take on" concrete identities because of "the way
we conceive and create and then possess and employ goods."
Walzer is giving the notion of living in our everyday world
of concrete particularism an unusual twist. It is not at
all a mere taking up and living the practices that come down
to us, accepting what was good for our fathers as good
To do that is not to be concrete at all;enough for us.
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conception and creat ion-- " the naming of goods, the giving of
meaning, and the collective making"
--are integral aspects of
having a concrete identity.
But do people ordinarily experience their concreteness
in this way? Is there not perhaps something extraordinary
about grasping the concreteness of the world and the moral
relations embedded within in it. If so, then there is
something extraordinary about the task of addressing others
as they are concretely oriented in Walzer's understanding.
Only if we are creative interpreters of traditions can
Walzer's traditionalism be critical. Like MacIntyre,
getting the right relationship to traditions is a difficulty
Walzer must face up to.
Another way of looking at this problem of the location
of the self is to see the significance of a narrative for
Walzer's understanding of history. Few people, ordinary or
otherwise, see themselves standing in a "history of trans-
actions" with the "moral and material world". To see our
moral obligations as intimately related to a personal his-
tory which is part of a social history, and then to argue
that history places before us obligations that we must
assume comes very close to leaving the "cave". Again, my
point is that references to a concreteness we supposedly are
fail to address what we actually are, or usually are.
Walzer must address the problem of our situatedness if he is
to get his project underway. Both must focus on the ques-
tion of what constitutes a historically minded community a
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community in which individuals can understand and grasp
themselves in the traditions of their community.
Social Criticism and the Historical Community
We can see the importance of a historical community, a
community bound by a history, if we examine Walzer's proble-
matic conception of social criticism. If we pursue the
question of the basis and the possibility of social criti-
cism within Walzer's thought, we end affirming the existence
of a historical "people" as central to the enterprise of
criticism. In other words, we will see the presence of a
"people" as a prerequisite to the functioning of effective
social criticism. Unfortunately for Walzer, the issue of
what creates and sustains a "people"
,
a group of individuals
with a common memory--with a common tradition--is ignored by
Walzer. As a consequence we are inclined to find his notion
of social criticism highly suspect. It will appear that
Walzer values solidarity too much and individual freedom not
enough
.
To show why this is so, we shall begin by ascertaining
what the possibilities of internal criticism are—a question
which must delve into the notion of the "shared understand-
ings" constituting the spheres of justice. After discussing
shared understandings we will look at an example of their
critical power in Walzer's interpretation of the Pullman
Strike. Finally, we will examine the issue of criticism
across societies when we discuss whether, according r o
Walzer, Indian Caste society can be just.
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Walzer is committed to the value of internal debate
within each social sphere because there is no other way that
the spheres of justice could then be shaped and structured
by shared understandings. "Men and women are free when they
live within autonomous institutions ." 46 A free church is
in the hands of believers, a free university is governed by
academics, and the workplace does not subject workers to an
unquestioned authority. The key to our freedom within these
settings (our freedom in community) is to make political and
economic power (the two spheres of goods most likely to be
used to dominate the distributions of other spheres) un-
available for settling disputes over the meaning and conse-
quently the distribution of the particular social good in
question. Walzer faces the problem of satisfying the re-
quirement for a critical traditionalism and assuring that
the discussion of each sphere remains true to the particular
social meanings and traditions that underlie the spheres.
As we shall see the requirement that we keep discourse
focused on the concrete and particular seems to conflict the
critical requirement that traditions be subject to the
strongest possible criticisms under conditions that en-
courage such criticisms.
Walzer is attempting to shift our attention away from
the institutions of the state and toward the social areas of
life—work, play, worship, family, and so on . 47 It is in
the areas of concrete life where we can effectively exercise
our judgment and critical powers. State power is not dis-
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missed, its role however important, is secondary to the
process of deliberation among the participants in the vari-
ous social spheres . 48
...political power is the regulative agency for social
goods generally. It is used to defend the boundaries
of distributive spheres, including its own, and to
enforce the common understandings of what goods are and
what they are f or . .
.
[P]olitical power is always domi-
nant at the boundaries, but not within them. The
central problem of political life is to maintain the
crucial distinction between "at" and "in".
The state enforces socially determined distributions and
prevents society from using coercion or power in determining
the meaning of social goods. It maintains the integrity of
the spheres. Of course, wealth, another danger to the
autonomy of the distributive spheres, has to be hemmed in by
the state. Walzer cites as examples of state interventions
the legal prohibition of prostitution and bribery. Bribery
violates the sense that officeholders are not to be swayed
by monetary inducements. Prostitution turns sexual rela-
tionships into a commodity . 49
Walzer wants to avoid a politicization of social prac-
tices which ends up turning over the determination of the
spheres to the state. The process of interpreting tradi-
tions and elaborating the spheres of justice is primarily a
social process because only within the particular social
context can the distribution of social goods be adequately
discussed. Since each sphere has its own distinct prin-
ciples of distribution, the political language of the state
could only clumsily address the particular traditions of
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each sphere. Norman Daniels has argued that Walzer ignores
the problem of authenticity. 5 ®
. . .a culture may reflect a history of class struggle
and domination by a ruling class, or external cul-
tures.
. .[where] shared meanings are acquiesced in by
dominated groups... If the effects and artifacts of such
history are now reified into a shared social meaning we
seem to be finding right when there is only a history
of might
. .
.
Walzer would argue that if the church, for example,
cannot call on the troops, religious doctrine must rest on
the willingness of believers to accept the doctrine as true.
But even in this case, if our believers never argue doctrine
among themselves, should we accept their declarations of
belief as authentic? Put slightly differently, would we
want to say that they share in an understanding (i.e., have
an understanding of the doctrine)? Walzer agrees that
sharing understandings requires participation in their
determination (we conceive and create social goods",) and
that even politics has a role that may go beyond what is
allowed by the "at/in" distinction . 51
Nevertheless, the value given to debate as a means of
our coming to share understandings puts pressure on prac-
tices to legitimate their authority directly in discourse
—
not just any discourse but discourse modelled on the demo-
cratic idea of a citizen forum in which all participate.
The defense of industrial democracy makes this strikingly
clear
.
Walzer' s discussion of the attempt of George Pullman to
create a model factory town allows Walzer to compare 1 he
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authoritarian politics of the town with the structure of
authority in the factory. He states that although early on,
almost at its inception, the town of Pullman was seen as a
tyranny, as undemocratic and unAmerican, the conventional
understandings of the time ignored the power relationships
within the factory. The relative newness of the factory
system explains this ignorance according to Walzer. Soon
however, we find a movement for industrial democracy develo-
ping in response to the coerciveness of the factory (and not
just in response to demands for higher wages and shorter
hours, so-called "business unionism"). The key to Walzer 's
argument for treating the town and the factory as places
where power is manifested seems to be that both are places
of "cooperative activity" and hence, "places of decision".
"Property should have no political currency ... it shouldn't
convert into anything like sovereignty, authoritative com-
mand, sustained control over men and women." The discharge
of workers and the enforcement of rules without the pos-
sibility of appeal and opposition are exercises of power.
According to our shared understandings and traditions power
in our society must be democratized. Entrepreneurs have no
right to rule over us "unless they can win our agreement
.
As a piece of argument Walzer depends heavily on the
purported relation between his argument and the beliefs held
on the political side of the labor movement. Walzer can
maintain that he is both arguing from a tradition (the naked
exercise of political power must be resisted say the wor-
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kers) and furthering the debate by taking on the compelling
view, also current in our political culture, that an indivi-
dual's property is his own to do as he pleases. Walzer sees
himself as attempting to redraw the boundary between poli-
tics and the economy in a way responsive to the new forms of
economic activity the meaning of which workers in the in-
dustrial democracy movement first discerned.
How far would Walzer extend the democratization of
social institutions? According to his definition of power
relations democratic discourse would play an important role
in every area of society because the conception and creation
of social goods is defined as a "collective making". In
other words, each of us helps to make social goods. The
process of making and creating social goods is essential to
our achieving self-respect, the sine qua non of justice. It
is for that reason that the exercise of power over us is
abhorrent and potentially so pervasive.
The question about the proper role of the state in
policing the spheres of justice raised at the outset of the
discussion can now be roughly answered. In the case of
industrial democracy for example, the state ought to require
factories and other places of work to institute more
democratic procedures of decision making. Now there are
strong reasons for suspecting that Walzer is willing to
adopt relatively "loose" criteria for what counts as par-
ticipation in the creation of meaning because his vision of
a democratic society does not lead Walzer to reject non-
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democratic societies as tyrannical. Thus, there may be
grounds for thinking that his criteria for participation in
the creation of meaning is not identical with the democratic
ideal of equal participation.
Walzer maintains that when we are just to persons of
foreign cultures we respect them as "culture-producing
creatures
.
. . .By virtue of what characteristics are we one
another's equals? One characteristic above all is
central to my argument. We are (all of us) culture-
producing creatures; we make and inhabit meaningful
worlds. Since there is no way to rank and order these
worlds with regard to their understanding of social
goods, we do justice to actual men and women by respec-
ting their particular creations. And they claim jus-
tice and resist tyranny by insisting on the meaning of
social goods among themselves.
Can one insist upon the meaning of a social good if
there is no public space that allows one to insist upon and
defend one's interpretation of the meaning of social goods?
In addition, how can he claim that we produce culture unless
we participate in the making of culture? How is that pos-
sible unless a discourse articulated within a public space
(where each values the contribution of the other no matter
what social position the other occupies) shapes culture?
To the extent that Indian Caste society lacks a public space
for discourse there is a reason for doubting whether justice
prevails. Put more strongly, arguing this way must lead to
the rejection of certain forms of society and elevate a
democratic society as an ideal . ^ Walzer must clarify how
it is that Indians "shape" their culture. Does Walzer 's
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argument that the presence ot a profession of teachers or
prophets and an audience free to listen hold water?
Although he resists out of respect for the social
meanings of foreign cultures elevating democratic societies-
-a respect based on the alleged fact that the culture was
collectively produced--Walzer qualifies his support of the
possible justness of caste society.
. . .Perhaps the lower caste members were angry and
indignant (though they repressed their feel ings ) . . . I
f
that were so, then it would be important to seek out
the principles that shaped their anger... [and they]
must have their part in village justice...
...Assume now that the Indian Villagers really do
accept the doctrines that support the caste system. A
visi tor ... might try to convince them— it is an entirely
respectable act ivi ty--that those doctrines are false.
He might argue, for example, that men and women are
created equal not across many incarnations but within
the compass of this one...
The process of seeking out and shaping critical principles
even if it does not necessarily require the institutions and
practices of a democracy for articulation (we can imagine
slaves conspiring among themselves against their masters)
can find its way into village justice only if criticism is
respected by the dominant castes. How can that be if equal-
ity holds only across incarnations and not within the com-
pass of this one? First of all, the idea that each person
from whatever social position can contribute to the under-
standing of what doing justice demands seems at odds with a
hierarchical order in which authority is assumed to be
located at the top. A collective process of articulating
meaning requires a sense that social position has little to
do with one's potential contribution. In other words, we
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are all equally permitted to speak of justice. Of course,
upper caste members might respond pragmatically to dissent
issuing from below. Pragmatic adjustments designed to quiet
the articulation of critical principles is hardly a picture
of distributive justice. Social goods in this case would
not be distributed according to shared understandings of the
meaning of social goods. Rather, a politics of revolt and
accommodation would determine the distribution of social
goods .
Furthermore, the image of visitors coming to villages
and discussing the justice of the caste system presupposes a
public space in which mutual discourse has a lively part to
play, which in turn demands a concept of equality. In
conclusion, Walzer has not argued very forcefully for the
possibility of the justness of caste society. It is hard to
imagine what the notion of "creating and shaping culture"
means in the context of caste society.
But in fairness to Walzer it should be note here that I
have tacitly assumed that culture and meaning are produced
and created only within a kind of adversary proceeding in
which differing accounts compete for justification. I have
both ignored the obvious vitality of Indian culture and
uncritically recommended concepts of discourse and equality
despite the actual dearth of social criticism in our cul-
ture .
It is for a good reason that Walzer would want to
defend the possibility that a society radically different
124
from our own may be just
. In order to persuade us to turn
to traditions, he must address the fact that traditions
often do not have their origin in a rational decision or a
process of deliberation that included more than a select
number of participants. If we disrespect cultures and
historical periods and the traditions emanating from them
because of their origin in a "dark age"
,
then we are effec-
tively excluding the possibility that traditions can be
sources of our identity and important terms of understanding
political and moral reality. With a suspicious glance cast
all around us and with hope in the reasoning of an autono-
mous individual freed from the past, we avoid the task of
conceiving traditions because it requires that we permit
"things in the saddle to ride us". Once we reject standing
in traditions we take ourselves out of our particular,
historically conditioned situation, and render ourselves
5 5incapable of making, producing, or interpreting culture.
In short, the defense of caste society helps us to see how
social criticism and talk of justness functions in a dif-
ferent cultural context. Ultimately Walzer needs an argu-
ment explaining how critical discourse is conceivable within
a society that seems inhospitable to critical discourse.
Walzer faces the following problem: Emphasis on the cre-
ation of meaning when coupled with the importance attributed
to a public realm of discourse for the creation of that
meaning casts suspicion on traditions that come down from a
less than democratic past. Given that no tradition can
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claim to have been created or shaped by a broadly conceived
public discussion, we are tempted to dismiss the past and
look elsewhere. For example, we might be tempted to invent
a morality de novo or "go to the mountain top" to discover a
moral i ty
.
But in a recent work, Interpretation and Social Criti-
c_ism, Waizer argues against invention and discovery by
defending what he calls interpretation
.
56 Interpretation
works on an already existing morality and depends on the
vitality of our relationship to traditions. Invention or
discovery of our moral world is really unnecessary "because
we have always lived there." Here Waizer again treats our
relationship to moral traditions simply as a matter of fact.
...No design procedure has governed its design and the
result is no doubt disorganized and uncertain. It is
also very dense... like a home occupied by a single
family over many generations, with unplanned additions
here and there... The whole thing ... lends itself less to
abstract modeling than to thick description . .
.
57
Yet, Waizer asks the important question: why are we
bound to look only in the already existing moral world? Why
is this existing morality, "the product of time, accident,
external force, political compromise, fallible and particu-
larist intentions"
,
authoritative ?56
...morality is authoritative for us because it is only
by virtue of its existence that we exist as the moral
beings that we are. Our categories, relationships,
commitments, and aspirations are all shaped by, ex-
pressed in terms of, the existing moral i ty ... Discovery
and invention are efforts at escape ... [which are
|
unnecessary. The critique of existence begins, or can
begin, from principles internal to existence itself.
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I n Interpretation and Social Criticism we do find an argu-
ment for how traditions support social criticism and how
perhaps criticism can begin from principles internal to
existence
.
Walzer begins by casting doubt on the need for inven-
tions and discoveries. Inventions and discoveries when
closely examined turn out to be similar to the morality we
already hold. They are really interpretations of existing
morality and not real discoveries or inventions . ^ Second-
ly, truly novel arguments are not as compelling as moral
arguments rooted in the existing morality. For a novel view
to be effective it must rely on acts of coercion or it must
interpreted in the terms, categories, and experiences of the
existing morality. Walzer allows that invention can have
heuristic value. However, it cannot supplant the inter-
pretation of the existing morality.
Cited as evidence for the first claim is Thomas Nagel's
discovery of the principle, "don't be indifferent to the
suffering of other people" . Nagel claims to derive the
principle from "no particular point of view". And indeed it
sounds as if it were a product of a detached mind, someone
who had stepped back and found objective truth. Walzer
comments that the discovery is not at all a discovery (we
already knew it), but rather it is a flattened version of
existing morality. It is a weak principle in comparison
with "love thy neighbor as thyself." It is furthermore an
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uncertain principle, because how we would apply it from a
position of nowhere in particular is unclear . 60
Walzer shows that the method of argument found in Rawls
is akin to interpretation. The correction of our moral
intuitions "by reference to the model we construct out of
those same intuitions", the process of reflective equi-
librium, is a process that focuses not an objective morality
but on our "own principles and values ." 61 It becomes impor-
tant then to understand how social criticism takes place
within the existing moral framework. The urge to find a
universal corrective for social practices will not otherwise
be set aside.
Walzer goes on to discuss what I would call the in-
gredients of social criticism. Here we find an outline of
an argument that might clarify why social justice is pos-
sible in caste society and how social criticism is possible
within the existing moral framework. Walzer clearly rejects
the view that democratic institutions are absolutely neces-
sary for the practice of social criticism. As long as there
is "cultural elaboration and affirmation", teachers, story-
tellers, priests, sages, and so forth, an opening for social
criticism exists. *
Walzer then discusses the conditions that favored the
emergence of prophecy in ancient Israel. The emergence of
prophets as social critics required a relatively weak
priesthood and bureaucracy. Some freedom from the inter-
ference of political and religious authorities was neces-
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sary. Secondly, the principle ot solidarity, "the idea of a
people as an organic whole united by election and covenant"
characterized prophetic teaching
.
63 This is also an impor-
tant condition social criticism because without the sense of
a people uniting the past and the present, the prophets'
references to the past and their interpretations of the
heritage of Israel would have been lost on their audience.
The prophets could share a universe of discourse with their
audience because both the audience and the prophets par-
ticipated in the historical community of Israel. In this
case at least social criticism depends upon the existence of
a historically defined people. According to Walzer social
criticism existed in ancient Isreal without democracy.
There must be among some sense of connection to the
past for references to traditions to have an impact on the
audience. Without the notion of connectedness to a past
which is represented in the idea of a people the search for
core values in our existing condition, in our particular
historical and cultural location, would be impossible. The
very notion of a core value or an ideal that can juxtaposed
to actual social practices depends on social practices
having an historical depth. Therefore the presence of a
historical community, a "partnership" seems essential to any
social criticism that turns on the notion of a "core" value
64
or the notion that a "people" have a mission.
Walzer clarifies the character of the criticism of the
prophets. The history lesson the prophets gave did not
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implore Israelites to return to a golden past or to a set of
standards that had been enunciated in antiquity. For ex-
ample, the prophet Amos altered the meaning of oppression by
substituting the term "ashok" for the term " lahatz" commonly
used in Exodus. The standard of what counts as oppression
shifted from political coercion to maltreatment and ex-
r* p
ploitation. The prophets connected the tradition and
interpreted it in accordance with the experience of their
own contemporaries.
Therefore, if we understand that the turn to traditions
depends on both freedom from interference and solidarity-- a
"people", an "immortal society", an attachment to tradi-
tions--then we cannot dismiss the possibility that caste
society may be just or that traditions may be worth recal-
ling. Although caste society may lack the degree of freedom
of expression we enjoy, the sense of solidarity it may have
might make social criticism a more likely possibility there
than in our own democratic culture. The formal guarantees
of free speech and assembly although vital to us may not be
more important to the practice of social criticism than an
audience capable of following, articulating, and judging a
social critique. Freedom of expression is obviously impor-
tant because without it participation in social criticism
would be impossible. So perhaps there is within caste
society enough of a public space for expressing criticism.
Caste society seems to fulfill the requirement of being a
historical community. Walzer's thinking on this question is
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extremely provocative and challenging to our own prejudices
concerning social criticism. However, Walzer himself must
face up to the challenge of clarifying the nature of a
historical community. We have witnessed just how important
such a concept is for his conception of social criticism.
Like MacIntyre, Walzer pays insufficient attention to the
constitution of a historical community. If we push his
example of prophecy in ancient Israel we must consider the
importance of the Hebrew religion. Walzer' s apparently
secular appropriation needs to consider the fact that
Israelites believed the prophets to be the voice of God.
God was at the center of prophetic discourse and not "shared
understandings"
. God commands a respect that human ar-
tifacts cannot--unless they are the artifacts of our beloved
ancestors. Walzer has not revealed the entire set of condi-
tions at the root of prophecy. Even the Burkean notion of
inheritance and the immortal community it supported was not
a secular concept. Our place in existence-- in our histori-
cal community— is providentially ordered.
MacIntyre mentions the idea of inheritance, but has no
sense of the term's emotional resonance. He seems to pre-
sent to us a purely secular theory. As we have seen his
concept of a community bound by a common narrative—a common
set of open-ended traditions— is without a cogent explana
tion. It behooves us to pursue further the issue of the
character of our relationship to a community that stretches
back to the past.
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CHAPTER 4
LIVING OUR INHERITANCE: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS
Forgetting Over Remembering
Kundera begins The Unbearable Lightness of Being with a
discussion of Nietzsche's idea of eternal recurrence. He
finds the idea of recurrence squarely opposed to the light-
ness of being. If every second of our life recurs an in-
finite number of times then "we are nailed to eternity just
as Jesus Christ was nailed to the cross." Under an assump-
tion of an eternal return, history has substance or
"weight." What happens is not lost; when I contemplate what
I am about to do or what is about to happen I must under-
stand that not everything is pardoned in advance because of
forgetting. In other words, my actions have a kind of
immortality attached to them. As Kundera puts it, the myth
of the eternal return stated negatively (and this obviously
informs our situation) means that in the absence of
recurrence things are "dead in advance." No matter how
beautiful or horrible, that which does not return means
nothing. If the French Revolution were to occur eternally
("a Robespierre who eternally returns, chopping off French
heads") we would have to form a judgment on it. However, if
"einmal ist keinmal" (what happens once is nothing) then
" [ t ] he bloody years of the revolution [will] have turned
into mere words, theories, and discussions" capable of
"frightening no one." 1 Through our forgetfulness the past
suffers a loss of reality.
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It is not kundera 's contention that being is unavoidab-
ly light or that the weightiness of the eternal return must
be preferred without question. Being nai.led to eternity is
also an "unbearable responsibility ." 2 What puzzles Kundera
is why we should be so quick to think that the lightness of
being is preferable. Sheldon Wolin has raised this puzzle
in terms of our tendency to prefer "new beginnings" that
erase the past over affirming our inheritance and birth-
right. He too seems puzzled by the predilection for the
lightness afforded by an escape from history.
Obviously, if the lightness of being is our destiny a
turn to traditions is hardly a possibility. Speeches honor-
ing and remembering the dead would amount to nothing. In a
"light" world the dead can find no rest among the living.
They will not have the "whole earth for their tomb ." 4 Of
course, our own actions can have little weight. Our "in-
heritance" cannot provide us with a "moral starting point"
if it exists merely as baggage from the past and not as the
lived, and therefore morally compelling world of our fathers
and mothers. Nor can inheritance provide a moral starting
point if it exists solely as an object of nostalgia. When
the past becomes simply material for pleasant childhood
reminiscences, history is easily betrayed.
Kundera has an acute understanding of how nostalgia
conspires with kitsch to drive out history, politics, and
criticism. Kitsch presents to us a world which is accepted
without reservation . 5 In a world dominated by kitsch criti-
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cism is only directed against those who would expose the
shit
' in the world. In totalitarian societies one finds
kitsch inquisitions. In more democratic states kitsch
manifests itself in more subtle ways. Criticism of existing
practices is rejected as being merely negative or is ridi-
culed as unpatriotic. Kitsch rests on a desire for the kind
of solidarity represented in a May Day parade, or in a
Fourth of July parade. In these celebrations reality is
irreproachable and criticism is useless against the march of
happy believers
.
10
For Kundera what distinguishes kitsch is the second
"tear." We observe our children playing in a field, we
smile and perhaps shed a tear of happiness. If we shed a
second tear because of how nice it is to be so moved toge-
ther with all of humanity, then we have entered into kitsch.
For kitsch, solidarity as such is the vital thing, and the
non-existence of individuality or disharmony is the essen-
tial ingredient.
Kundera describes reading a book on Hitler's youth and
being struck by feelings of nostalgia for a lost period of
his youth. Hitler as he actually was recedes into the back-
ground to be replaced with a pleasant sense of having
touched a lost period of the reader's youth. It seems that
our desire for a fundamental agreement with being, and the
denial of "shit" such an agreement entails, fosters forget-
fulness and encourages nostalgia. But let us examine the
characters Milan Kundera presents in The Unbearable L i g_h t_Z
Il®-§s
—
of Being in order to understand whether kitsch and
nostalgia can be defeated.
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Sabina is a painter with a single idea: Reality is a
double-exposure, a confluence of two worlds. She explains
her first cycle of paintings, "Behind the Scenes", as show-
ing "on the surface, an intelligible lie; underneath, the
unintelligible truth ." 7 Her art does not express a blending
of past and present, but rather the sense that truth and
beauty are found only behind the scenes, away from the
crowds, and in opposition to all public conceptions of
truth, beauty and goodness. Smash the scenery, reject the
happy May Day parade, and then we may find beauty . 8 Sabina
must reject her lover Franz precisely because he is good and
kind. Her "truth" and "beauty" must be always uniquely her
own and they must deny what others would have her value and
betray what she herself values.
Sabina's adult life begins with a betrayal of parental
authority. She marries the man her father forbade her to
love. Later on she leaves her husband, finding freedom once
again in flight. When she finds out that the secret of her
affair with Franz will become public the beauty of their
relationship is diminished and her emotional involvement
with Franz weakens. As she grows older she drops her Czech
origin from her biography (one more betrayal) and eventually
moves to America. There she experiences the melancholy of
one whose burden is the unbearable lightness of being. rom
time to time she yearns for a return to a happy family ife
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with the bonds of affection "home" suggests but she realizes
that she is thinking of a mythic family only. She has the
melancholy of one who must never keep ranks but who never-
theless yearns for home.
She brings her life to a consistent end by forsaking
the confinement of a coffin and tombstone for cremation and
the spreading of her ashes. She will die under the sign of
lightness; her ashes will be lifted up and away by the air
currents. In death she will achieve pure lightness.
For Sabina, insofar as the past presents moral obliga-
tions the past must be betrayed. Her originality is a sign
of having smashed the scenery and the commonplace and found
truth and beauty. Generalizing some, we can say that the
flight from our birthright, or from history, or from our
inheritance, can be motivated by this desire for flight and
betrayal. The Underground Man of Dostoevski is motivated by
a rejection of himself that is very similar to Sabina's
betrayal. Kundera shows us that betrayal has a logic that
is difficult to avoid once one is caught up in it. He
claims that we cannot betray our betrayal; we cannot betray
g
ourself back to the point before the first betrayal.
Sabina has a bowler hat which once belonged to a great
grandfather who had been a mayor of a small town. For
Sabina the hat is a reminder of that great grandfather and
her father (who had at one time owned it) but more sig-
nificantly, the hat is a prop for love games with Tomas and
a monument to their love affair. The world of her great
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grandfather survives only as one of the semantic streams, a
rather minor one at that, coalescing in the bowler hat . 1(1
A more complicated character, one who eventually
chooses for "heaviness" after tasting considerable "light-
ness," is Tomas. Tomas interests us because he also shows
signs of having a conscience or of having integrity, both
qualities in short supply in a world ruled by forgetfulness.
Kundera describes the character of Tomas as born of the
phrase "Einmal ist keinmal" and as having the "Devil's gift"
of compassion. 1 It seems that the key to Tomas' continued
involvement with Tereza is his feeling of compassion for
her--a feeling he cannot flee even when his compassion costs
him his chosen profession, what he thinks of as his life's
calling. The education of Tomas consists of the working out
of the struggle between his gift/curse of compassion and his
sense that if something occurs only once (a chance occur-
rence without necessity) it means nothing at all. What
Tomas eventually overcomes is the idea that life must have
at its center an "Es muss sein" , a sense of necessity, or a
directing mission in order for there to be meaning to life.
Tomas does not lose himself in the transitory when he gives
up the idea of a necessary mission. Relinquishing the "Es
muss sein" allows Tomas to fully love Tereza; their love
carries Tomas beyond his need for necessity. The dream-
ideal love (for our necessary missing half12 ) which kept
Tomas from fully loving Tereza gives way to an acceptance of
1
3
his love for her— a love "born of six fortuities.
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The relationship generated by love between two people
is an example of one type of obligation. From this rela-
tionship we might be able to generalize about our moral
starting point. A political counterpart to an ideal love is
in Kundera 1 s words the fantasy of the "Grand March ." 14
The Grand March is the movement of history toward
justice and brotherhood in which all members of the politi-
cal left participate. This necessity is a piece of kitsch
which has found favor among those who would otherwise refuse
to be in agreement with being. As the silliness of the
march on Cambodia indicates, the Grand March, like the
dream-ideal of love, is a detour from reality which blinds
one to the actual relationships one is part of and the real
possibilities that exist . 15
Is not Kundera saying perhaps that what undermines the
sense that we have an obligation to someone or something is
our mistaken belief that an obligation or relationship
requires the backing of an "es muss sein"? Dissatisfaction
with the fortuitous nature of events and of our lives, and
thus our inability to live this life without an inner neces-
sity, is a result of searching for a necessary mission or
ordering principle. Real and satisfying relations are close
at hand if we give up the search for a necessary mission and
learn to live with relations born of fortuity. This would
seem to be a way of accepting our moral starting point a
way by which we can overcome our reluctance to take on the
burdens that we have been born into.
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The resistance of the young German who refuses respon-
sibility for the Holocaust or of the Englishman who refuses
responsibility for Northern Ireland may well be based in a
rejection of any necessary link between themselves and the
events of years ago. Their demand for necessary connection
(show me how 1^ am involved) obviously cannot be met. How-
ever, if we accept our lives as ruled by fortuity of being
born German or English, we must then find our "mission", as
it were, in the fact of our birth in a particular country
containing a particular set of obligations which are crucial
to our country's identity. This obviously includes a na-
tion's history. (A nation's real history; not the kitsch
informed history.) We may thus conclude, paradoxically,
that in Kundera's necessity-less world, where eternal return
is only myth a moral starting point in social identities is
possible
.
However, it is clear that for Tomas his personal rela-
tionship with Tereza is his greatest concern, determining
his political choices on several occasions. When asked to
sign a petition protesting the treatment of political priso-
ners he hesitates until the image of Tereza being hounded by
the secret police comes to his mind. He then decides for
Tereza's safety over the symbolic importance of signing the
petition. Tomas is not apolitical. He has several oppor-
tunities to return to his profession of medicine, all of
which he rejects on political grounds. In one instance he
resigns his position at a clinic so that statements falsely
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attributed to him could not be used against an editor.^®
Kundera describes him as "bound by an unspoken vow of fidel-
ity, so he stood fast." When asked to retract a letter he
wrote in order to stay on as a surgeon at a hospital he
eventually decides against retraction because he could not
bear the smiles" of all those who would have expected him
to retract his letter. ^ Here he fights against the pre-
sumption of necessity— that of course, he will retract his
letter and join the ranks of the politically silent. He has
his profession to lose and seemingly very little to gain.
His letter in itself was trivial and not only that, the
editor who published it, distorted it by cutting out crucial
portions. He has no attachment to the letter. But he does
have integrity; he cannot act out of what he clearly recog-
nizes as cowardice.
The letter that eventuates in his new profession of
window washing is a response to the heated debate during the
time of Dubcek over whether members of the Communist Party
knew or did not know of the atrocities committed in the
1950s. Using Oedipus as his example, Tomas argued that the
question of whether ignorance confers innocence was a false
one. They are irreparably guilty; they ought to feel the
irreparable guilt of Oedipus rather than protest their
innocence. Here we see both how important remembering is
for reminding the guilty of their responsibility and how
difficult it is to make the claim of responsibility stick
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when guilt is narrowly defined, allowing "forgetfulness" to
take hold.
The last character we will discuss is Tereza, who ex-
emplifies the strange twists an "inheritance" can give a
life. In Tereza we find a woman both debilitated and in a
way enabled by the life led by her mother. She clearly
shows the problems an inheritance may bring as it is passed
down to us. Tereza lives out her life in the shadow of her
mother
. Her inheritance from her mother conditions her
entire life, affecting her perception of herself, how she
moves and walks, and what she seeks in life.
The portrait Kundera draws of Tereza's mother is un-
flattering. A beautiful and vain young woman (the very
"image of Raphael's madonna" according to her grandfather)
who made foolish choices in love, she aged into a vindictive
woman proud of vulgarity and resentful of Tereza's exis-
tence. Tereza, the result of an accidental pregnancy, is
blamed for her unhappy marriage. Tereza is taught right
away that being a mother means sacrificing everything.
Tereza becomes, of course, "Guilt with no possibility of
redress. " ^ The consequences for Tereza are immense. She
drops out of school in order to help her mother, to lighten
her burdens and somehow atone for the crime of being her
daughter. "Guilt" sends Tereza looking beyond her home for
salvation. Her relationship with Tomas carries that burden.
And as one would expect Tereza does not desire a child of
her own.
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The most significant influence of the mother is her
boastful vulgarity
.
21
Tereza's mother blew her nose noisily, talked to people
in public about her sex life, and enjoyed demonstrating
her false teeth. She was remarkably skillful at loose-
ning them with her tongue and in the midst of a broad
smile would cause the uppers to drop down over the
lowers in such a way as to give her face a sinister
expression
.
Her behavior was but a singie grand gesture, a
casting off of youth and beauty...
In her household the mother declared a state of war on
modesty and beauty. Having lost her own beauty, she sets
off to show that beauty itself is worthless. Since all
bodies are the same, modesty shown about one's own body
indicates a false pride (what makes you think you're so
special!). Rather than object to Tereza's father taking a
prurient interest in her nightly bath, the mother objects to
Tereza's attempt at having some privacy. The immodest
O O
mother gives way to a very modest daughter.
(And if Tereza has a nervous way of moving, if her
gestures lack a certain easy grace, we must not be
surprised: her mother's grand, wild, and self-destruc-
tive gesture left an indelible imprint on her.)
It not only affected how she moved, her mother's crass way
of life led her to "yearn for something higher." She became
a reader of books and an avid listener of classical music.
Led by her rejection of her mother's life Tereza leaves her
small town for the city becoming a photographer for a maga-
zine. The desire for something higher helps Tereza compen-
sate for her lack of formal education. From the overall
picture we have of Tereza we must conclude that ^he mother s
influence plagued her throughout her life. What enables
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Tereza to get past her inheritance is not any insight into
her mother's power over her. Her pet dog helps her under-
stand unconditional love. This insight enables her to
overcome her overwhelming need to receive love and thus be
cleansed of her guilt.
In summary, remembrance faces the difficult challenge
of combating the joint forces of kitsch and nostalgia. It
is easy for the linkage to the past to be a sentimental
recollection. We see Adolf Hitler, not the author of the
Final Solution whom we should fear and loathe, but, as
Kundera testified, as a reminder of our nearly forgotten
childhood. We seem to want to grab hold of what is past but
only as kitsch--only shitless . 23
...In the sunset of dissolution, everything is il-
luminated by the aura of nostalgia, even the guillo-
tine.
If political action requires for the sake of rational-
ity that our deeds live on past us Kundera seems to offer
little hope . 24
. . .Before we are forgotten, we will be turned into
kitsch. Kitsch is the stopover between being and
oblivion
.
How we will be remembered, if we are remembered at all, will
have little to do with what we experienced and what we were.
Those who survive us understand us according to their own
designs. A nonconformist poet is given an eulogy by a
communist official. Tomas is given an epitaph by his son
that confirms the son's religious beliefs but violates the
sense Tomas gave to his own life. In death Franz cannot
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defend himself against his wife's claim that it was she he
loved and not his mistresses. The only accurate epitaph is
given to a dog by Tomas and Tereza. Ironically, "he gave
birth to two buns and a bee", is so personal (it is from a
dream of Tereza) and true, so precisely tailored to Karenin,
that it can carry no historical weight. Only Tomas and
Tereza understand it. The immortal society in which we live
on seems unavailable; instead a display room of kitsch
awaits us
.
In the Afterword to The Book of Laughter and Forget-
ting
,
Kundera sheds additional light on the problem of
forgetting . 2
5
The metaphysics of man is the same in the private
sphere as in the public one. Take the other theme of
the book, forgetting. This is the great private pro-
blem of man: death as the loss of the self. But what
is this self? It is the sum of everything we remember
Thus, what terrifies us about death is not the loss of
the future but the loss of the past. Forgetting is a
form of death ever present within life. . . .But forget-
ting is also the great problem of politics... A nation
which loses awareness of its past gradually loses its
self.
In the Unbearable Lightness of Being Kundera tells us that
kitsch curtains off death . 26 In other words, I would argue
that kitsch meets the threat of death only by obscuring the
real self, the self spun from the experiences of its his-
tory. Perhaps, Kundera is suggesting that if we reclaim our
real history—shit and all—we will not be tempted by the
simple world of kitsch.
Our reading of Kundera showed how nostalgia, a form of
remembrance, threatens accurate and honest remembei mg.
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Critical traditionalism, criticism itself, is impossible in
a world dominated by nostalgic yearnings. With Tereza we
see the double-edged nature of an inheritance. The past
generation passes down more than its wisdom.
Alfred Doeblin: Serving the Dead
Sophocles' tragedy Antigone has a central place in this
novel about political life in Germany after the First World
War. Antigone's lament for her dead brother--her willing-
ness to lose her own life for the honor of her dead brother-
-serves as a leitmotif reminding readers of the significance
of the question, what do we owe the dead?
It was suggested earlier that an obligation to the
dead, to our dead ancestors can locate us in traditions by
making the world of the dead--their hopes and dreams, their
ways of 1 i fe—mat ters of great significance. Mourning their
deaths requires that we take seriously their world, who they
were and what they lived for. Karl and Rosa shows us some
problems that serving the dead may bring.
Friedrich Becker, a veteran of the war who has returned
to teaching classics after recovering from war injuries both
physical and emotional, finds himself in conflict over the
meaning of Ant igone with the students in his class. He
departs from the theme of universal , higher truth versus the
politically and legally correct judgment, the theme which
interested his students and led them to derisively dismiss
Antigone as naive and self-righteous. In their minds she
neglected to think of the common good which Creon and the
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state represents. To the class Antigone is just plain
silly a silly woman, a girl. Becker is shocked at their
unwillingness to criticize the state. Here is a generation
that knows nothing of the war, the very event which has so
changed his own life and which continues to dominate it.
Finding his class unwilling to accept the idea of a
higher authority, Becker gives the talk they requested the
first day the former First Lieutenant walked into the class-
room. However, his war remembrance was not at all what they
wanted. Rather than celebrate the German state and criti-
cize her enemies, especially those internal enemies respon-
sible for Germany's defeat, Becker announced that we, the
entire German nation, are at fault for the war and have been
punished by God . 28 The class rebels, "What is there to
blame the people for?" Becker cannot give a firm answer.
The punishment is obvious, just as it was obvious to
Oedipus. Similarly, as with Oedipus' guilt, the crime
committed is not clear. The young students persist and
Becker, who thinks that the fact of Germany being punished
29is obvious, takes up Antigone one last time.
Behind the question "state versus individual" or "duty
to the state and to unwritten law" there lies the
hidden question of death itself. And that brings us
directly to the central theme of the tragedy of Ant i
—
gone. Some of you have taken offense at the notion
that a whole tragedy should be built upon the question
of whether a dead man should be buried or not. To you
it seems absurd that such an argument concerning a
funeral should have such massive consequences. But to
formulate it precisely for you: the theme of Anti_gone
is. . .How is the world of the living to treat the world
of the dead?
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Becker goes on to argue that the real hero of the play is
Polynices, the dead brother of Antigone.
The subject of the play is the claim of a dead man upon
the living. A warrior has fallen. He has left behind
no unsullied memory. This dead man does not become
visible, nor palpable, nor even audible in the play,
but he forces his way into the world of the living and
finds an advocate in his sister Antigone. A woman
takes up his cause. Just as it is a woman who receives
the unborn, those who are not present among us.
Polynices is held back and cannot speak for himself,
but he works through her
,
uses her body and soul
,
and
she cannot escape him. Nor does she want to escape him
either
.
And Becker has precisely these same feelings toward the dead
of the war; they are his dead. "Just as Antigone takes up
the cause of her dead brother, so have I taken up that of
the many who fell, the many who died too young, who departed
so totally unaware. I know I serve them, I shall not forget
them."" At issue is not the validity of this interpreta-
tion of Antigone . Doeblin has given us a clear and plaus-
ible picture of the power of the dead over the living. We
can well imagine a response to the horrors of WWI which
refuses to let it slip away into forgetfulness. When Becker
wonders why he was spared, we understand his sense of having
an obligation to do something for those who were not. As
Becker's story proceeds the obligation to the dead helps him
make some courageous choices. He becomes sensitive to all
who suffer and adamantly rejects arguments calling for
suppressing personal feelings for the sake of political
goals. We need to ask whether Becker truly lives out the
analogy he draws between himself and Antigone, a woman, who
can serve those yet to born as well as those who have passed
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away. Does Becker neglect the future because of his obliga-
tion to the dead? Is he blinded in any way by his pas-
sionate avowal of the rights of the dead?
Before answering that question we shall turn to another
major character, Rosa Luxemburg, who we find in prison in
the final year of her life. She faces the same predicament
as Becker. Upon hearing that her friend, a would-be lover,
Hannes
,
has died in combat near Stalingrad she becomes
overwhelmed with grief ; 31
And now I’ll have to die right along with him from
morning till evening, .and on through the long nights.
...locked in like Antigone in her bridal chamber ... who
will save me?
Rosa makes up for the minimal involvement Hannes had in her
life while he lived. A fantasy of Hannes becomes her daily
companion. She no longer lives for herself--"to perish for
Hannes, to die that new life may grow ." 32 In a way Hannes
becomes the lover she dreamed of but never had time for
because of her politics. More significantly, Hannes is a
dead man she feels obligated to in the same compelling way
of Becker's. Her devotion to Hannes seems very natural and
reasonable to her. Serving the dead is self-evident; can
something that exists become nothing? Rosa wants to help
Hannes become human again and she begins to treat him as a
real lover. They have a wedding and honeymoon; they take
trips together. Doeblin indicates that there is a dark side
to Rosa's devotion to Hannes. J
The song had begun with cruel pain, with desperation
and longing. Then the fantasies had become part of it,
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conversations had developed, the courting, the bliss, a
wedding grew from it--and now?
Rosa admits she speaks with Hannes in tongues of angels or
devils. Indeed, soon Rosa grows frightened of Hannes; he
wants some of her warm blood . 34 Hannes and Satan become
intertwined until Rosa rejects Satan, "the warrior, the
defiant one, the seeker of revenge, the one with the poison-
q C
ous soul."' Doeblin compares Satan to a corpse outside the
heavenly gates that no one will bury. Satan has some inner
connection to a death that refuses to be buried--like the
death of Hannes. It seems that Rosa's remembrance of Hannes
was in part a refusal to accept that he was dead. This
refusal grew into a singleminded pursuit of life for Hannes
which threatened Rosa herself.
Becker's obligation to the dead at first seems to have
purely salutary results. When the director of his school is
under attack Becker works hard at finding some just solu-
tion. Even when the personal costs are great Becker stands
by the Director. However, Becker ends up involving himself
in revolutionary politics for extremely questionable
reasons. His personal code of ethics gives way to "letting
go" and "following his heart ." 36 The reason for Becker's
collapse is the seeming impossibility of making good his
debt to the dead . 37
Do I owe to them to sit at their graves like Antigone,
to bring them flowers and prey for them? Am I doomed
to Antigone's fate—simply to raise a lament [or the
dead?
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Obviously Becker cannot be content with merely lamenting
their deaths, just as he refuses to be satisfied with per-
forming any "last rites" for the dead. The reason for this
lies in the responsibility he feels for their deaths. His
responsibility is not unique to himself; he thinks that
everyone has that responsibility. Nevertheless, with a
responsibility so great one must ask, what action or actions
on his part could possibly make good his obligation?
I think the answer is simply that there is nothing that
Becker could do which would atone for their deaths. Becker
points to the dark side of his loyalty to his dead friends.
He announces that he will also go down their same path for
"he loved their death because God had sent it to them." 08
In other words, what Becker can do is join them in death.
Or put slightly differently, the one thing the responsible
and guilty can do is put out their eyes: Inflict punishment
o q
on themselves.
I take Doeblin to be arguing that death can destroy us
well before we meet our grave. Upon the death of an in-
timate we move from overwhelming grief to an incapacitating
and se 1 f -des t rue t ive responsibility and guilt. We "Prome-
theans" ought to be able to do something for the dead.
40 If
we cannot
,
then we deserve the severest of punishments
.
However, we all can appreciate the situation Becker and Rosa
find themselves in. We can also plainly see the difficul
ties that face a critical traditionalism that is mediated
through a remembrance of the dead.
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Instead of bringing us closer to the world the dead
left behind, that is, their traditions, ideals and self-
understandings, speaking and living for the dead can lead us
away from the task of engaging traditions within an open
political conversation to politics that has self-destruction
as its end.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
The turn to traditions must obviously face the dif-
ficulties Kundera and Doeblin illustrate in their novels.
Doeblin presses the argument that I developed from Burke. I
argued that the acceptance of our moral and political in-
heritance need not entail subservience to the traditions of
our ancestors as long as we recognize that the present is
never identical with the past and that our fathers did not
have an "exclusive confidence in their reasoning. 1,1 Attend-
ing to the train of events as they emerge demands more than
careful observation of contemporary events. Burke argued
that justice cannot be understood unless we penetrate the
stale language of moral platitudes with a "troublesome
application" of the concepts of justice. I take Burke to be
noting the importance of placing our concepts of justice
under the pressure of questioning in order to know them
correctly. Only by closely attending to "events as they
emerge" can tradition be a "living tradition." The reason
for this is simple. When our attention is focused on injus-
tice and the political issues of the day, we do not approach
traditions with an attitude of nostalgia. Expanding on the
Burkean notion, we can say that the focus on contemporary
events problemat izes our moral notions, forcing us to con-
sider the meanings of our traditional values. Now, the
question has been: Is involvement in traditions compatible
with a critical understanding of them? Too often the criti-
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cism of traditions shows little understanding of them; and
the traditionalist perspective pays insufficient attention
to the debates and disagreements at the root of traditions.
Harold Bloom's idea that we ought to struggle against being
completely defined by the canon from a position of intimate
acquaintence is not exactly a Burkean view . 2 it is, how-
ever, in fundamental agreement with Burke's understanding
that we will be blind to the present if we treat our in-
heritance in the manner of "historical patriots" --as a
collection of platitudes. In comparison with Nietzschean
deconstruction, where traditions (texts) have no standing as
objects worthy of respect, Bloom's appropriation from within
traditions acknowledges their significance. Although Bloom
does not directly address the problem of our location in
traditions, the fact that his essay stresses that we must
struggle from within the canon by extending the canon tacit-
ly recognizes the prevalence of interpretations of tradi-
tions which attack them from the outside. These interpreta-
tions make insufficient contact with traditions . 3 What
motivates interpreting traditions from within? Why locate
oneself within the canon? The artist chooses to subordinate
himself to traditions of his craft in order to become profi-
cient as an artist. Shall we say that a Professor of
English must subordinate himself to the canon in order to
practice textual criticism? If one approaches the canon
with the anticipation of criticizing it, I doubt if one is
then working from within the canon. Gadamer is instructive
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on this point . 4 We must ask, what attitude or motivation
supports interpreting traditions from within?
The power of Burke's concept of inheritance (the extent
to which it is morally compelling) seems to depend upon
emotions developed within our "small platoon" --that place
where intimate relations grow. For nearly all of us in-
timacy is first experienced in a family. Although comrades-
in-arms, friends, and lovers are intimate relationships the
family is a place where generations meet and where therefore
the present has the opportunity to meet the past . 5 It is in
the family where intimate relations can actually represent
certain traditions . 5 An Aunt may personify the Baptist
faith, a mother the traditional role of housewife, and the
father may come to represent a particular profession or a
set of strongly held opinions.
One clear problem to giving to politics, "the image of
a relation in blood," is whether criticism "within the
family" supports a critical traditionalism, or whether such
criticism is apt to be muted out of deference. Deference to
wise ancestors might be motivated by respect of the type
Burke recommends ( "men of uncommon wisdom who did not have
an "exclusive confidence in themselves"). Deference to
traditions motivated by fear of offending ancestors would
place a severe constraint on criticism. If Gadamer is
correct deference has a positive value in so far as it
allows traditions an opportunity to speak. Much depends on
the precise character of family relationships. An author-
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itarian family
,
to take just one example, might inculcate a
traditionalism characterized by tear of departing from the
letter of the tradition. A family with a more democratic
ethos might support a traditionalism that is open to criti-
cism .
7n Karl and Rosa Alfred Doeblin explores what happens
when an intimate relationship is shattered by death.
Becker's act of mourning drives him to his own destruction.
The view that the war dead can become "powerful sacred
symbols which organize, direct, and constantly revive the
collective ideals of the community" must be qualified . 7 We
must somehow bury the dead before our memorials can act as
"symbols." Doeblin points to the Christian belief in Christ
the redeemer as a solution to the overwelming sense of
responsibility and guilt the living feels toward the dead.
The impact on a turn to traditions is clear. Our act
of mourning for our ancestors or friends can obliterate
traditions, push them aside as we seek to bring the dead
back to life. Unless we make peace with death the past will
come down to us only in the form of painful memories.
Avoiding the threat of an overwelming sense of obligation to
the dead by fleeing from the past becomes an attractive
option
.
For Kundera "kitsch" masks death and mediates a for-
getting of the past. Despite the near irresistable quality
of kitsch Kundera recommends and believes that a struggle
for memory is nevertheless possible. Kundera illuminates
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how a self might be willing to assume a role or identity
that resulted from a confluence of "fortuities." The elimi-
nation of the demand for necessity (the demand that either I
experience an "es muss sein, " or my life has no purpose)
opens the way to accepting our accidental location in his-
tory. In terms of our theme of how we are located in tradi-
tions Kundera adds another insight into how we may accept
and find compelling our standing in traditions.
Both Michael Walzer and Alasdair MacIntyre need a
concept of a historical community. Without a sense of a
community persisting over time it makes no sense to speak of
a collective narrative that I belong to. Similarly, the
prophets of Walzer are inseparable from an audience capable
of relating to the traditions the prophets claim to speak
for. And the relationship of a prophet to his audience can
only occur in a community with a memory of its past. But
how does the individual come to feel a sense of belonging to
history? Although not without its problems as we have seen,
Burke's notion of inheritance does support a concept of an
"immortal society", of a historical community. The family
genealogy ties us to the collective narrative. The idea
that our place in existence has been divinely ordained helps
solidify the narrative by guaranteeing sense (God has a plan
even if we cannot discern it)
.
MacIntyre can say very little to the young German who
has no interest or sense of concern for the Holocaust or to
the Englishman who feels no responsibility for Northern
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Ireland. If they admit to having a "moral starting point"
it will not be found in "their" nation's history.
It has been an assumption throughout this dissertation
that the turn away from abstract modes of political theori-
zing and the turn toward traditions actually enhances polit-
ical rationality. The young German who reflects on the
Holocaust will better understand himself and his culture. A
German politics that squarely faces NAZISM will be informed
of the dangers latent in the German polity. The Englishman
who acknowledges responsibility for Northern Ireland and
understands the historical context will be both motivated to
work on a political solution and more able to understand the
terms of the debate over Northern Ireland. A polity with a
history can build on the wisdom and folly recorded in its
history. Political action itself will seem more attractive
because one can assume that future generations will at least
attempt to understand the traditions and values that are
presently argued about and acted on.
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NOTES
^See Chapter Two, p.62, n.50.
2See Chapter Three, n.55.
'^Michael Shapiro, a contemporary proponent of genealogy,
describes genealogical criticism as "disruptive", as com-
mitted to an inquiry that "seeks endlessly to dissolve the
coherence of systems of intelligibility that give individual
and collective identities to persons/peoples ... by recreating
the process of descent within which subjectivities and
objectivities are produced." (Shapiro pp . 14-15.) What the
genealogist discovers is that "all modes of intelligibility
are appropriations, the momentary fixing of the resultants
of contending forces that could have spawned an endless
variety of versions of the real." Our self-conception and
the corresponding social order are always an imposition "on
a set of forces which constitute both a yearning for accom-
modation to an order and a resistance to it." (Shapiro p.5.)
The genealogist assumes that the self is always more than
any substantive account of it, and that any substantive
account is always an imposition. This rather negative way
of describing the situation of the self who seemingly must
be an amorphous nothing in order to be true to itself is
counterbalanced with the optimistic sense that genealogical
inquiry can shatter the imposed order and provide access to
possibilities which "go beyond the scripting of the institu-
tionalized modes of control." (Shapiro p.4.) Of course, any
transgression towards a new possibility for the self can
only be an imposition that will provoke internal opposition
within the self
.
Neither MacIntyre nor Walzer would agree that all
social orders and sel f-concept ions are impositions on basic-
ally anarchic material. MacIntyre sees Nietzscnean celebra-
tions of arbitrariness as a sign of the decay of moral life.
But there is an important area of agreement. A less radical
version of genealogy is compatible with the turn to tradi-
tions. Genealogists attack the idea of a "stiff, steadfast,
single individual" and the notion that the prevailing order
represents an ideal order "exhaustive of the possibilities
of value .
"
Walzer is obviously committed to the idea that core
values and social structure, including the institutionalized
means of control, are at odds. More importantly, Walzer I
think would resist the idea that the core values contain an
ideal social structure the realization of which would send
social critics into retirement. Interpretation is always
with the past in terms of contemporary developments. Jnless
history ends--there is no new economic developments such as
the factory system to take but one example--interpretat ions
of the tradition will always vary.
Walzer 's self who seeks to attain self-possession is
definitely oriented towards a unified conception. dowever
,
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the concept of distinctive spheres of meaning allows for a
pluralist account of the self.
MacIntyre's narrative order is committed to intel-
ligibility, but not in such a way that conflicts of value
must be eliminated, or denied to be real. The Sophoclean
self is Nietzschean to some extent. In short, neither Walzer
nor MacIntyre are interested in the project of persuading
modern selves to either identify with the social roles
presently validated by the dominant institutions or with
self -concept ions dug up from the past.
If genealogy would substitute for its celebration of
arbitrariness the idea that we should seek more appropriate
formulations of the self and the corresponding order in
light of its history and the contemporary nature of social
and political life, then the turn to traditions would differ
little from genealogy. Of course, the arbitrary nature of
the self and the social order is a central tenet of genea-
logy. It motivates inquiry to be disruptive of continuities
with the past (history is a weight bearing down on the self)
and allows for a sense that new possibilities are being
revealed. For when the self is deconstructed the collection
of forces that truly are the self can take a new form. The
new possibilities revealed are very unlike those that are
achieved in the critical traditionalism of Walzer and
MacIntyre. In genealogy the "new" must be a radical depar-
ture, it must bear the marks of resistance to any relation-
ship to past. Continuity of any sort denies the arbitrary
nature of the self. Accordingly, Bloom's struggle against
facticity from within traditions, a struggle which extends
the canon, might be thought of as too accommodating, too
willing to allow traditions a power over us.
Michael J. Shapiro, "Writing, The Self, and the Order:
Rationalistic, Critical, and Genealogical Approaches",
(Paper Delivered at the Annual Meeting of the APSA, Washing-
ton, D.C.
,
1987)
.
4See Chapter One, n.22, n.23.
^Friendship may certainly prepare one for the "I-Thou"
relationship Gadamer thinks best describes our location
in traditions.
^Lovers and friends are too much like us; they tend to be
our contemporaries. They are less likely to implicate us in
a past
.
^See Chapter One, p.8 and n.10.
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